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THE EVOLVING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE AND SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Michael J. Frank*
Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good govern-
ment and the happiness of mankind, schools, and means of educa-
tion shall forever be encouraged.'
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that educa-
tion plays a fundamental role in preserving the political, economic,
and cultural structure of the United States.2 That august body was
certainly correct when it observed that a sound education is "the very
foundation of good citizenship, . . . a principal instrument in awaken-
ing the child to cultural values."'3 It is necessary to "prepare citizens
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
if we are to preserve freedom and independence." '4 These sentiments
are in accordance with those of America's founders, such as Thomas
Jefferson, who believed that education was crucial to good citizenship
and was society's greatest defense against the advent of domestic tyr-
anny.5 This wisdom has not been lost on this Nation's contemporary
leadership, which has recently reiterated that enhanced education is
imperative to the ability to repel foreign invaders. 6 In a related vein,
it has been recognized that proficiency in education is essential to the
* B.A., Canisius College, 1992; J.D., St. Louis Univeristy, 1997; LL.M., New York University,
2001.
1. The First Congress readopted the Northwest Ordinance passed initially by the Continental
Congress in 1787. The quote is from the Third Article, which pertained to land for schools. First
U.S. Congress, Third Article of the Northwest Ordinance, Continental Congress, 1787.
2. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982) (stating that education plays a "'pivotal role' in
sustaining our political and cultural heritage.").
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221 (stating "education
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society").
4. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
5. Jefferson also wrote, "The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the
very first object should be to keep that right." Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Edward Carrington,
Jan. 16, 1787, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 381 (Adrienne
Koch & William Peden eds., 1944).
6. George F. Will, The Need for National Testing, in THE LEVELING WIND: PoLITics, THE
CULTURE AND OTHER NEWS 199 (1994) (stating that "[t]oday the principal threat to America is
America's public-education establishment.").
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Nation's economy, as it provides the means by which citizens lead eco-
nomically productive lives to their own betterment and that of soci-
ety.7 Not surprisingly, then, Americans "have always regarded
education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme
importance."8 In the high-tech economy of the new millennium, and
in light of the technologically advanced weaponry that protects the
United States, a sound educational system has become increasingly
imperative to America's interests at home and abroad.
Religious schools, in particular, have risen to the occasion by effec-
tively instructing students according to the principles and truths of the
myriad disciplines that are indispensable to moral and economic suc-
cess in the modern world. Whether on the primary, secondary, or ter-
tiary level, these institutions dedicated to the transmission of
knowledge have served America well.9 Their accomplishments have
not gone unnoticed, as even the federal and State governments have
perceived the special benefits that religious schools confer on the Na-
tion,10 whether through the inculcation of moral values, or through
outstanding instruction in the sciences and humanities. Even a fre-
quently hostile Supreme Court was forced to concede that "non-pub-
lic schools have played an important role in the development of
American education" and the American Republic.11 "Private educa-
tion has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in raising
national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience."'1 2 Its
"contribution has been and is enormous." 13
7. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221 (stating "education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.").
8. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
9. Of course, there is nothing like failure to make even minor successes stand out. The
vaunted success of religious schools may be due, in part, to the failures of public schools,
whether in teaching morality or grammar. See, e.g., George F. Will, 1991: Fate Wields a Black-
jack, in THE LEVELING WIND: POLITICS, THE CULTURE AND OTHER NEWS 45 (1994) (noting that
"A college-bound New York City student said he was glad the schools were distributing free
condoms because 'I don't want to get no disease.' Schools give children condoms before, or
instead of, grammar. First things first.").
10. Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled in part by Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971); Bd. of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247(1968).
11. Ball, 473 U.S. at 397, overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
12. Allen, 392 U.S. at 247.
13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625. Even liberal commentators acknowledge that religious schools
play an important role in American education, if for no other reason than that they provide a
different perspective. See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: Civic EDUCATION IN
A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 250-51 (2000) (stating that Americans should "prize and pre-
serve the tension between the shared civic values represented by public schools and the particu-
lar moral and religious values of families, churches, and other moral communities. No one
source of authority should dominate the educational landscape."). Macedo admits that vouchers
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Unfortunately for America, however, many parents cannot afford
the benefits of a private school education. At the same time, society
cannot ethically, economically, or militarily afford an undereducated
citizenry.' 4 Yet this is exactly what some public schools systems are
producing. Realizing the gravity of this situation, various State gov-
ernments have attempted to assist underprivileged students by award-
ing education vouchers that enable the parents of these students to
select a private school education for their children. In many locations,
this might be the students' only chance to receive a sound education.
For some, it also might be their only chance to escape the vicious cycle
of poverty into which they were born and in which many will die, pre-
maturely at that.15
Better-educated students mean better lives, better Americans, and
a better America. But in many school districts, "better" is not even
part of the vocabulary, especially where a plausible deficiency is now
tolerated as the norm. A pitiful pedagogy permeates the very founda-
tions of many monopolistic school districts even though the very exis-
tence of the American constitutional system of government is riding
on society's ability to produce a well-educated citizenry.t 6 In light of
this fundamental need for better education and the correlation be-
tween religious schools and academic excellence, 17 it is surprising that
may be one means of ensuring diversity of opinion, although he objects to the funding of "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions. See id. at 270-71.
14. As Aristotle wrote, "The best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be
of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the
[Clonstitution." Aristotle, Politics, Book V, 9, 1310a12-18, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1251 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). Or as a more contemporary sage has put it: "Morality is an
essential soil for free and democratic governments." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS
GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 142 (1996). Despite the fact that
government is depenent upon public morality, it may not be the best producer of this morality.
"Even though public morality is a public good, its maintenance depends far more on contribu-
tions of private institutions than on those of law and government." Robert P. George, The Con-
cept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. OF JURISP. 17, 19 (2000).
15. "They say that those who have riches enter hardly into the kingdom of Heaven, By Jove,
they do; they are like Struldbrugs; they live and live and live and are happy for many a long year
after they would have entered into the kingdom of Heaven if they had been poor." SAMUEL
BUTLER, THE WAY OF ALL FLESH 335 (The New American Library, Inc., 1960); (1903). Be-
cause many of the students who would benefit from vouchers are underprivileged, it has not
escaped notice that vouchers also serve a social justice function. See generally Nicole Stelle
Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, The First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 301 (2000).
16. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (stating, "An educated populace is essential
to the political and economic health of any community .... ").
17. Milton Friedman relates one example of education excellence at a Catholic School in the
Bronx, which is not otherwise known for its fine academic institutions.
One example at the elementary level is is a parochial school, St. John Chrysostom's,
that we visited in one of the poorest neighborhoods in New York City's Bronx. Its
20021
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the Constitution itself has been invoked by those who seek to deny
government aid to those most in need of-and most unable to af-
ford-a decent education. 18
Starting only in the latter half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court frequently used the Establishment Clause to invalidate pro-
grams that utilized government funds to assist religiously affiliated
schools, even though these programs proved beneficial to both the
students and the nation. 19 The Court's shameful Establishment
Clause track record may be attributable to the difficulty of interpret-
ing the vague contours of the Religion Clauses,20 the overzealousness
of some justices for the eradication of imagined violations of the First
Amendment,2 1 or even their hatred for a particular religion. 22
Whatever the motivation behind this line of decisions, at least a por-
funds come in part form a voluntary charitable organization, New York's Inner City
Scholarship Fund, in part from the Catholic Church, in part from fees. The youngsters
at the school are there because their parents chose it. Almost all are from poor fami-
lies, yet their parents are all paying at least some of the costs. The children are well
behaved, eager to learn. The teachers are dedicated. The atmosphere is quiet and
serene.
The cost per pupil is far less than in public schools even after account is taken of the
free services of those teachers who are nuns. Yet on the average, the children are two
grades ahead of their peers in public school. That's because teachers and parents are
free to choose how the children shall be taught. Private money has replaced tax money.
Control has been taken away from the bureaucrats and put back where it belongs.
MILrON AND ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 159 (1980).
18. Besides providing underprivileged students with a better education than they might re-
ceive in a public school, vouchers result in greater liberty concerning school choice, encourage
parental involvement in education, and create healthy competition with the public schools. See
James A. Peyser, School Choice: When, Not If, 35 B.C. L. REV. 619, 620 (1994).
19. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602; Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (direct aid to religious schools and reimbursement and tax relief for par-
ents); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of equipment and instructional materials),
overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Ball, 473 U.S. at 373 (program
providing remedial teachers to religious schools), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997).
20. Many Justices have noted the interpretive difficulties that the Establishment Clause
presents. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986) (Marshall, J.)
(stating, "The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has consistently presented this
Court with difficult questions of interpretation and application."); Ball, 473 U.S. at 385 (Bren-
nan, J.) (stating that the "Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes
.... "), overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 392
(Rehnquist, J.) (stating, "the Establishment Clause presents especially difficult questions of in-
terpretation and application."); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (Burger, C.J.)(stating, "The language of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is at best opaque, particularly when compared with
other portions of the Amendment.").
21. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... U.S. CONST. amend. t, cl.1.
22. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality opinion) (the doctrine of prohib-
iting aid to "pervasively sectarian" schools was "born of bigotry," as it was a code for banning
aid to Roman Catholic institutions).
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tion of the Supreme Court has recently seen the error of this approach
and retreated from the untenable positions staked out by some of the
Court's more activist members. Inching closer to an original under-
standing of the Establishment Clause,23 the Court has upheld the re-
imbursement of funds used by parents to send their children to
religious schools, 24 the use of state funds to purchase textbooks that
23. "For most of our nation's history, the Establishment Clause was understood to do no more
than forbid the enactment of laws preferring one faith over another." Hon. James L. Buckley,
The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARV. J. oF L. & Pun. POL'Y 189,
194 (2000) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
24. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, a lengthy opinion written by
Justice Black, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New Jersey law providing for the trans-
portation of students to both public and private schools. Id. Part of this money was for the
payment of transportation of children to Catholic parochial schools. These church schools give
their students, in addition to secular education, regular religious instruction conforming to the
religious tenets and modes of worship of the Catholic Faith. Id. at 3. Mr. Everson's main com-
plaint was that the New Jersey program forced citizens to financially support the teaching of
religious tenets to which they were opposed, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Justice
Jackson phrased the relevant question: "Is it constitutional to tax this complainant to pay the
cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified denomination?" Id. at 21 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
In addressing this issue, Justice Black's majority opinion, despite holding for students, reads
like an indictment of organized religion. Indeed, the opinion is cluttered with diatribes about the
need to quarantine religion so that a reader might think the Court was addressing a clear and
present danger from marauding missionaries, rather than grammar school students hoping to
hitch a ride to school. The opinion also set forth broad principles of non-establishment, and then
promptly disregarded them in its holding. For example, the Court stated, "The First Amend-
ment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregna-
ble." Id. at 18. It remarked that the Establishment Clause forbids "laws which aid one religion"
or "aid all religions." Id. at 15. Similarly, the Court stated that no "tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions..." Id. at 16. The Court
obviously did not mean for its words to be taken literally, as it promptly admitted that New
Jersey was using tax money to pay for the transportation of children to Catholic schools, which
unquestionably aided the Catholic Church in disseminating its religious message. Yet Justice
Black found nothing wrong with this assistance to religion, suggesting that when they were build-
ing the high and impregnable wall between church and state, the Framers installeded large win-
dows at regular intervals. Or, more likely, no such wall was ever intended or has ever truly
existed.
The Court's holding in Everson probably rests on the neutrality of the program and the fact
that any benefit to the dissemination of a religious message was secondary to the primary bene-
fits to the State: fewer children get hurt in accidents while attempting to go to school; better
attendance at school; and the inculcation of strong morals. The Court observed that the First
Amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers." Id. at 18. Here, there was complete neutrality: any student attending school
in New Jersey was entitled to free transportation regardless of his religious beliefs. The record
apparently showed that children of all denominations received free transportation. And al-
though the record indicates that only Catholic school children obtained free transportation to
religious schools, there is no indication that other religions would not have been treated
similarly.
For purposes of the debate over the constitutionality of school vouchers, Everson is an impor-
tant decision. For the anti-voucher side, the case provides some important dicta. Despite that,
the case clearly demonstrates that government funding, which has the effect-but not the in-
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are then loaned to religious schools,25 special tax deductions for par-
ents who pay tuition at private schools,26 the funding of sign language
tent-of assisting one religion more than others, will not be held unconstitutional on that
ground. Thus, even under Everson, New Jersey could also have provided direct financial assis-
tance to parents who send their children to religious schools, so long as there was no discrimina-
tion against students or schools based on their religion and the funding serves some government
purpose.
25. See Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Allen involved a
New York statute that required public school districts to purchase school textbooks and loan
them, free of charge, to all students in grades seven through twelve, regardless of whether they
attended public or private schools. 392 U.S. at 238. Several school districts objected to the law
because it required that religious (i.e., Roman Catholic) schools also receive loaned textbooks,
purportedly in violation of the Establishment Clause.
In upholding the statute, the Court attempted to show that the loaning of textbooks was just
like the provision of free transportation to school upheld in Everson. Like the transportation,
the government funds were being used to serve a legitimate state interest: the education of chil-
dren. Similarly, the primary effect was the promotion of secular education. Furthermore, the
benefits were neutrally distributed, regardless of the religious affiliation (or lack thereof) of the
parents, students, or participating schools. As in Everson, it was also true that loaning of text-
books has the secondary effect of aiding religious educational institutions, as they could now
spend money earmarked for textbooks on something else, including things indisputably religious.
The presence of quality textbooks might also encourage some parents to send their children to
religious schools when they otherwise might not have done so. Nevertheless, "that was true of
the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree
of support for a religious institution." Id. at 244. Under Everson and Allen, then, where there is
neutrality in application, the secondary effects of aid programs will not prove fatal.
Another important aspect of the Allen analysis is that the Court was willing to assume that
state officials would not neglect their duty to ensure that only secular textbooks were loaned to
the schools. Id. at 244. Similarly, the Court assumed that the school districts could do this with-
out interfering with the religious schools. In later cases, the Court departed from this approach,
refused to indulge in such presumptions, and indeed presumed that state actors and religious
schools would act collusively to violate the constitution. See, e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at 387 ("there is
a substantial risk that, overtly or subtly, the religious message they are expected to convey dur-
ing the regular schoolday will infuse the supposedly secular classes they teach after school"),
overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Fortunately, the Court's more re-
cent cases indicate that this Establishment Clause paranoia has been cured, or is at least not
immediately manifesting itself.
26. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388. Mueller involved a Minnesota income tax provision that allowed
taxpayers to deduct certain expenses-such as those for tuition, textbooks, and transportation-
incurred in providing an education for their children. See MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1994).
Finding the practice objectionable, several Minnesota taxpayers sued the Commissioner of the
Minnesota Department of Revenue and several parents who took advantage of the provision.
Although they claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause, both the district court and the
Eighth Circuit rejected their claim.
In a five to four decision authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Court affirmed. Its decision
carefully applied the Lemon analysis. First, the Court held that although there is no express
statement of legislative purpose for the tax provision, the Court would presume a secular pur-
pose when the face of the statute gives no indication otherwise. Mueller, at 394-95 n.5. As to the
primary effect of the deduction, the Court reiterated that simply providing some collateral aid to
religion does not offend the Establishment Clause. Id. at 393. In other words, an attenuated
financial benefit to religion does not violate the Constitution.
The Court stressed the neutrality of the tax provision as a program "that neutrally provides
state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the
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interpreters at sectarian schools,27 and the use of federal funds to pay
the college tuition of a handicapped student studying theology at a
religiously-affiliated college.2 8 Perhaps inspired by the inherent rea-
sonableness of this approach to the Establishment Clause, other
courts have recognized the constitutional legitimacy of voucher pro-
grams, whereby parents of grammar school students are provided
funds by the local government to send their children to the school of
their choice.29 But the specter of religious intolerance still rears its
ugly head from time to time, and so this incremental progression has
occasionally faced setbacks.
Despite significant gains in restoring a workable Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, 30 trial and appellate courts have continued to
invalidate government programs that would assist private schools in
the performance of their educational mission. For instance, in Sim-
mons-Harris v. Zelman,31 the Sixth Circuit invalidated a program that
distributed vouchers to underprivileged students who wanted to es-
Establishment Clause." Id. at 398-99. Here, the deduction was available to all parents, regard-
less of whether they attended a religious or secular school. The fact that the provision was used
primarily by parents of children in religious schools did not negate the neutrality of the provi-
sion. As the Court observed,
We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral
law on annual reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens
claimed benefits under the law. Such an approach would scarcely provide the certainty
that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled standards by which such
statistical evidence might be evaluated. Moreover, the fact that private persons fail in a
particular year to claim the tax relief to which they are entitled-under a facially neu-
tral statute-should be of little importance in determining the constitutionality of the
statue permitting such relief.
Id. at 401. The key, then, was the freedom of choice, not the extent to which individual parents
elected to exercise that freedom.
The purifying effect of private choice was an essential point in yet another respect. Id. at 399.
Any benefit to religion was the result of private parental choice, and this parental exercise of
individual judgment further erodes the state action that is necessary for a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. As the Court stated, "[Bly channeling whatever assistance it may provide to
parochial schools through individual parents, Minnesota has reduced the Establishment Clause
objections to which its action is subject." Id. at 399. Furthermore, where private choice is pre-
sent, such programs cannot reasonably be perceived as government endorsement of a particular
religion.
27. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (finding government funding
of a sign-language interpreter for deaf student in sectarian school does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause).
28. See Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (noting that direct
tuition payments to sectarian college that student was attending under state program for aiding
the blind does not violate the Establishment Clause).
29. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
30. The Establishment Clause has been made binding on the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
31. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 23 (2001).
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cape underperforming public schools and the cycle of poverty they
perpetuate. 32 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit rejected the evolution of
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, electing instead to restore ju-
dicial hostility to all things religious. 33 Because of the crisis in Ameri-
can education,3 4 state and local governments need to experiment with
new educational systems, such as privitization and parental choice. As
government and religion join together to banish the evils of ignorance,
cases similar to Simmons-Harris are likely to arise with greater fre-
quency. Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court selected Simmons-
Harris for its Spring 2002 docket to decide whether the Sixth Circuit's
views comport with the restored Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In Simmons-Harris, the Court must decide not only whether Cleve-
land's voucher program is constitutional, but whether it will continue
its progression toward an intelligible First Amendment jurisprudence.
This Article discusses the defects of the reasoning employed by
courts such as the Sixth Circuit, and the ways in which it differs from
the emerging Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 35 It examines the
relevant details of the Cleveland voucher program and the Sixth Cir-
cuit's erroneous treatment of the Establishment Clause in its Sim-
mons-Harris decision. 36 The case is then analyzed in terms of the
principles recently announced by the Supreme Court as it has grap-
pled with the Religion Clauses and the Court's inconsistent interpreta-
tions of those Clauses. In particular, this Article considers the
Mitchell v. Helms plurality opinion, and Justice O'Connor's concur-
rence in that case. 37 This Article concludes that the Simmons-Harris
decision cannot prevail against the reasoning of the developing Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence, and that the Cleveland program was a
legitimate exercise of State power to address an issue of both local
32. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education."). Notably, the Court
in Brown sought to address the problems associated with the deficient education that black chil-
dren were receiving at racially segregated schools. Through its voucher program, Cleveland
sought to address the problems associated with deficient education produced by socially segre-
gated schools.
33. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 945, petition for cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001).
34. Among the problems are "poor performance by American students on a variety of inter-
national education tests; a decline in scores on most standardized tests; and a decline in student
knowledge in crucial subjects such as English and physics." William J. BENNET[, OUR CHIL-
DREN AND OUR COUNTRY: IMPROVING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS AND AFFIRMING THE COMMON
CULTURE 222 (1988). Much has changed since Bennett first penned his book, but the consensus
seems to be that the crisis in education has not passed.
35. See infra notes 199-292 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Section IV.
37. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 833-36.
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and national concern.38 In light of this, it is almost a foregone conclu-
sion that the Supreme Court will reverse the Sixth Circuit's decision
when it finally addresses the case. This, in turn, should instill in the
States the courage to experiment with school choice and perhaps
other valuable alliances with mainstream religions.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND GOVERNMENT AID TO
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has addressed
many cases in which the federal government or the states attempted to
assist private schools, the students who attend them, and the parents
who frequently make substantial sacrifices to ensure that their chil-
dren receive a sound education.39 More often than not, the Court has
found this aid, whether direct or indirect, to violate the Establishment
Clause. But this hostility to governmental cooperation with religious
institutions is a somewhat recent phenomenon. As a glance at cases
from around the turn of the nineteenth century indicates, the Supreme
Court's understanding of the Establishment Clause has radically
changed over the years to the detriment of religion and society. For
example, in the 1899 case of Bradfield v. Roberts, the Court held that
government funding of hospitals operated by an order of Roman
Catholic nuns did not violate the Establishment Clause, even though
the Catholic Church exercised control over the hospital.40  Thus, in
38. See infra notes 293-297 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub.
Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
40. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899). Although the case did not involve the
funding of religious schools, Bradfield was one of the earliest Establishment Clause challenges to
public funding of religious institutions. In Bradfield, the federal government contracted with
Providence Hospital, which was run by an order of Roman Catholic nuns, to provide health care
for the poor in Washington, D.C. Id. at 294. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to enjoin the payment of the funds, and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in an
opinion written by Justice Peckham. Id. at 295, 300. Consistent with the Framers' understanding
of the First Amendment, the Court first expressed doubt that government funding of a religious
organization constitutes an "establishment of a religion" that runs afoul of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 297. But for purposes of deciding the case, the Court assumed that such disburse-
ments constituted some sort of "establishment." Even under this assumption, however, there
was no violation of the Establishment Clause because the incorporated hospital did not consti-
tute a religious organization for purposes of the First Amendment. This was true even though
the hospital was owned, operated, and controlled by a Roman Catholic religious order of
women, whose admitted purpose was to serve Christ. The Court found all of this to be
immaterial:
The facts above stated do not in the least change the legal character of the hospital, or
make a religious corporation out of a purely secular one as constituted by the law of its
being. Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under its charter happen
to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or mem-
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initial encounters, the Court found such cooperative ventures to be
constitutionally innocuous. But in 1948, the Court radically altered
the course of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In that year, the
Supreme Court held in McCollum v. Board of Education that public
schools may not permit part-time religious instruction on school prem-
ises as part of the school program.4' Because most religions can easily
conduct religious education on their own premises, the McCollum
opinion's immediate consequences were minimal. Its long-term ef-
fect-the banishment of religious morality from publicly-funded edu-
cational institutions-has been disastrous for the United States,
whether measured by surges in illegal drug use, violent crime, unwed
pregnancies, or school shootings. 42 Through McCollum and similar
bers of any religious organization, or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest
consequence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can the individual be-
liefs upon religious matters of the various incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it
material that the hospital may be conducted under the auspices of the Roman Catholic
Church. To be conducted under the auspices is to be conducted under the influence or
patronage of that church. The meaning of the allegation is that the church exercises
great and perhaps controlling influence over the management of the hospital. It must,
however, be managed pursuant to the law of its being. That the influence of any partic-
ular church may be powerful over the members of a non-sectarian and secular corpora-
tion, incorporated for a certain defined purposes and with clearly stated powers, is
surely not sufficient to convert such a corporation into a religious or sectarian body.
Id. at 298. Under this original understanding of what constitutes a "sectarian" organization, the
mere incidence of religion and government funding does not result in a constitutional cataclysm.
Under this view, there is no Establishment Clause violation when government contracts with
religious corporations to provide medical services-or even educational services-to the needy.
Unfortunately, this original understanding of the Establishment Clause later became obscured
by activist courts.
41. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (holding that a public school may not
permit part-time religious instruction on its premises as a part of the school program, even if
participation in that instruction is entirely voluntary and even if the instruction itself is con-
ducted only by nonpublic school personnel). Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)
(holding that the release of public school students for religious education off of public school
property was constitutional). Prior to the 1940s, the Court had little occasion to interpret the
Establishment Clause. See Mark E. Chopko, Vouchers Can Be Constitutional, 31 CONN. L. REV.
945, 945-46 (1999).
42. The McCollum opinion, of course, did not single-handedly foment all of these evils, and
popular culture also bears some responsibility, especially for the school shootings, which by
many accounts were influenced by media's glorification of violence (Incidentally, as if precluding
the government from instructing students in virtue wasn't bad enough, another line of First
Amendment decisions leaves the government powerless to regulate the media's bombardment of
teenagers with the message that sex and violence, and sexual violence, are perfectly acceptable
behaviors.) But McCollum and its progeny gave rise to a mandatory amorality in public schools,
and made it financially difficult for parents to send their children to religious schools, where
virtue is still sometimes inculcated.
By suggesting that mainstream religion, and morality based on mainstream religion, is unim-
portant and unworthy of instruction, these decisions created an ethical void quickly filled by
vice. The effect of these decisions was perhaps best expressed in by a fictional account of a
Columbine High School student corresponding with God. The exchange went something like
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decisions, the Court has invaded yet another area traditionally left to
the executive and legislative branches of state and local governments,
which presumably are more familiar with the needs of the citizenry
than is the Court.
More recently, however, at least four members of the Court-Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas-have attempted to bring the Su-
preme Court closer to its original understanding of the Establishment
Clause, as expressed by the Court in Bradfield.43 After spending the
latter part of the twentieth century in the dark ages of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, these Justices are attempting to catalyze a Ren-
aissance of religious collaboration with government, 44 perhaps recog-
nizing that as allies, cooperatively marshaling their respective
resources, both church and state have a better chance of defeating
common enemies, such as crime, teenage pregnancy, drug use, defi-
cient educational systems, and discrimination. These Justices have
woven yet another thread through the complicated tapestry that is the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Despite its complexity, there are some general themes and charac-
teristics fairly ascribable to the Court's Establishment Clause deci-
sions. First, many of the Establishment Clause cases, and almost all of
those dealing with aid to religious institutions, involve Roman Catho-
this: "Dear God. Why didn't you prevent the Columbine High School shootings?" To which
God replies: "I'm not allowed in the schools." Earl McCrae, Enquiring Minds Want to Know,
O'rrAwA SUN, Feb. 13, 2000, at 7. Adding insult to injury and taking pettiness to new depths, the
Columbine School encouraged relatives of the slain students to post tiles with tributes to their
loved ones in the school, but prohibited those that made reference to God or religious symbols,
presumably out of fear of violating the Establishment Clause. Richard Roeper, Columbine Gun-
shots are Reverberating Still, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 4, 1999, at 11. Contrary to popular
notions, the lesson to be learned from the Columbine tragedy may have more to do with the
First Amendment than with the Second.
43. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMER-
ICAN DECLINE 289 (1996) ("At the time [of the enactment of the Constitution], an establishment
of religion was understood to be the preference by government of one or more religions over
others."). As Justice Stewart wrote:
As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation upon
the newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly
suggest that the Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress
not only would be powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to
interfere with existing state establishments. Each State was left free to go its own way
and pursue its own policy with respect to religion.
Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 ([963) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (internal citation omitted). Other scholars argue that it is impossible to determine the origi-
nal meaning of the Religion Clauses. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1709, 1712 (2000) (noting that the Framers' intent is not clear and unambiguous).
44. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities ... it follows the best of our traditions").
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lic institutions, usually grammar schools. 45 Because the Catholic
Church has an extensive network of health care, social welfare, and
educational institutions, it is not surprising that the government might
find it expedient to collaborate with these institutions to promote the
general welfare. As Justice Clarence Thomas has noted, America has
been no stranger to anti-Catholic bigotry, and many of the cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of aid to Catholic institutions were likely
a product of vehement religious bigotry. 46 Those who objected to Ca-
tholicism found it repugnant that Catholic schools received even inci-
dental benefits from the government, and when they could not prevail
at the ballot box (e.g, the Blaine Amendment), they resorted to the
last best hope for unpopular causes and ideas: the courts.47
A second recognizable theme, related to the first, involves the par-
ties who have initiated the Establishment Clause lawsuits. Usually the
party complaining about government aid to religious schools is not a
student who was denied comparable aid, nor a competing religious
institution hoping to get a piece of the action. Rather, it is frequently
an organization that has an axe to grind with religion in general or
with Catholicism in particular.
45. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Allen, 392 U.S. at 236;
Everson, 330 U.S. at 1.
46. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29; see also Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unite of Separation
and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 57-58 (1997) (America's "anti-Catholic movement attracted
the favorable attention of Justices Black, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton, and the intellectual
attitude so pervasive, many of the other justices and the elite lawyers who would later become
justices were likely to have been exposed to it directly or indirectly."). Professor Berg has docu-
mented bigotry among several Justices:
Black referred to proponents of school aid as "powerful sectarian religious propagan-
dists ... looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their particular brand
of religion." Justice William Douglas, in later opinions, quoted a polemical anti-Catho-
lic book approvingly and accused institutional churches (of whom the Catholic Church
would be the epitome), of "feeding from the public trough" through charitable tax ex-
emptions. Douglas' opinions were also laced with unfavorable images such as that of
the Church "indoctrinating its creed." Justice Wiley Rutledge complained about the
"aggressive" and "persistent" posture of the Church on school aid. Four Justices at-
tended a Unitarian-sponsored rally in Washington, shortly after Everson, where speak-
ers celebrated Thomas Jefferson's anti-clerical religious views and, in an obvious
reference to Catholicism, criticized religions that exercised "autocratic ecclesiastical
control over the mind and conscience of [their] individual members."
Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 121,
129 (2001) (footnotes omitted)..
47. Invalidation of popularly-supported programs based on disagreement with Roman Catho-
lic theology or morality is hardly a sound basis for constitutional jurisprudence. Otis v. Parker,
187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903) (Holmes, J.) ("While the courts must exercise a judgment of their
own, it by no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon it
excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality with which they
disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as well as for possible
peculiar conditions which this court can know but imperfectly, if at all.").
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A third identifiable characteristic pertains to the Court's use of the
now infamous Lemon test,48 which looks to the purpose of the govern-
ment action, its effect, and whether it impermissibly entangles govern-
ment with religion. 49 In analyzing the cases under the first prong,
although it is sometimes difficult to ascertain legislative purpose, the
48. The Lemon test is infamous because "it has proved well nigh impossible to apply." STE-
PHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIAL-
IZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 110 (1993).
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman is one of the more notable Establishment Clause cases decided by the
Court. 403 U.S. at 602. It is the case in which the Court first articulated the now infamous
"Lemon test." It also represents the beginning of an era in which the Court routinely struck
down state programs that incidentally benefited taxpayers making use of religious institutions.
Lemon is also notable for being one of the few cases that have involved direct disbursement of
state funds to religiously affiliated schools. At issue was a Rhode Island statute that authorized
government funds to supplement the salaries of private school teachers and a Pennsylvania stat-
ute that reimbursed private schools for teachers salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials.
Id. at 606-08. As with most funding cases, these programs provided aid almost exclusively to
Catholic schools and their teachers.
From the start, the Court made it clear that it intended to read the Establishment Clause
expansively. It began with the premise that the Clause prohibits more than just government
establishment of religion; to some extent, it also prohibits laws "that could lead to such establish-
ment." Id. at 612. The Court did not offer guidance as to how imminent this danger of an
establishment must be before a constitutional violation occurred, other than its now famous
Lemon test. Under that test-which simply added a third prong to the purpose and effect test
the Court customarily employed in Establishment Clause cases-to withstand constitutional
scrutiny: (1) the law must have a secular purpose; (2) it must not have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) the law must not foster an "'excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."' Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 674 (1970)).
Not surprisingly, the Court held that both programs failed this test. Applying the test, the
Court easily found a legitimate purpose for the laws-enhancement of the quality of educa-
tion-even though one of the other purposes of the laws must have been the aid of religious
schools. Id. at 613. The Court's problem was with the excessive entanglement prong. Id. As to
the Rhode Island program, the Court thought it relevant that the schools receiving aid were
adjacent to a church, were closely tied to the religious mission of the Church, and had crucifixes
on the classroom walls. Id. at 615-16. Based on these attributes, the Court deduced that relig-
ious schools have "substantial religious character," which "gives rise to the entangling church-
state relationships of the kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid." Id. at 616. Ironically, the
Court believed that the entanglement was exacerbated by the fact that the State, in an attempt to
comply with the Establishment Clause jurisprudence, prohibited the teachers whose salaries
were subsidized to teach courses in religion. Id. at 618. Because enforcement of this rule would
require monitoring, the State might meddle in the school's affairs, which apparently respects the
establishment of religion.
The Pennsylvania program fared no better under the entanglement prong. A significant prob-
lem, from the Court's perspective, was that Pennsylvania provided direct aid to the religious
schools, as opposed to other programs through which the funds were distributed to students and
parents. Id. at 621. Although the direct aid apparently posed no Establishment Clause problem
in itself, the Court believed that such aid required greater oversight by the State to ensure that it
was spent on non-religious items, thereby requiring significant entanglement of the state and a
church-affiliated school. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621. Interestingly, Pennsylvania had not yet
adopted intrusive oversight procedures, and, thus, there was no excessive entanglement for the
Court to condemn. Undeterred by this inconvenient detail, the Court presumed that intrusive
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Court usually has no trouble finding a secular purpose for whatever
aid the government provides to citizens through the religious institu-
tion. The purpose of the aid is frequently one that is particularly im-
portant to society, such as health care or education, and the Court has
been wise enough not to second-guess the legislature on this point.
Moreover, when a court wants to invalidate a program, it really is not
necessary to use the purpose prong, as the other two prongs are much
more pliable and lethal. Thus, when seeking to hold programs uncon-
stitutional, the courts generally resort to the "primary effect" prong of
the Lemon test.50 In essence, the courts find that the primary effect of
the governmental action is the provision of some benefit to some re-
practices would be adopted, even though there was "no basis for predicting that comprehensive
measures of surveillance and controls" would ever be implemented. Id.
The final entangling feature isolated by the Court was the political activity the Court believed
the aid would engender, as if political activity were an evil to be avoided. "In a community
where such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be assumed that
state assistance will entail considerable political activity." Id. at 622. The Court failed to explain
how political wrangling over government funding has somehow become constitutionally suspect
activity under the Establishment Clause, particularly because other aspects of the First Amend-
ment protect and, thereby, encourage political fights. The best the Court could come up with is
the following: "The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political pro-
cess." Id. Is divisiveness a threat to America's two-party (i.e., divided) political system? If that
is so, divisive "speech," such as flag burning, should also be suspect. Yet the passions engen-
dered by flag burning do not factor into the Court's analysis of its constitutionality and certainly
has not stopped the Court from protecting such "expressive conduct" under the First Amend-
ment. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Government funding of abortion is also divisive, but the fractures in the polity that it has
wrought does not make it unconstitutional, even though it also leads to an entanglement of the
government with religious protesters. The funding of some welfare programs is also controver-
sial and divisive. That does not make state funding of such programs-whether religiously based
or otherwise-a violation of the Constitution, even though the government funding spurs con-
tentious debates between advocates and critics of the funding. See, e.g., Bradfield, 175 U.S. at
291 (some members of the public objected to the government funding of a religious hospital).
America has succeeded in maintaining unity, despite divisiveness, because its citizens previously
were united by core values whose gravitational force is superior to the various forces that have
attempted to tear the nation apart. Justice Antonin Scalia, among others, derides those who
accuse religion of creating the hobgoblin known as "divisiveness." See Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 126 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Good News
Club must have the liberty to recruit new members "even if, as Justice Stevens fears ...its
actions may prove (shudder!) divisive").
Unlike government by unelected judiciary, at least with the political process' advocates have
the opportunity to persuade their fellow voters of the need to adopt their particular position,
despite the fact that heated debates and "divisiveness" may arise. As Learned Hand said,
"[Clounting heads is not an ideal way to govern [but] at least it is better than breaking them."
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 433 (1994). In short, the
Court's reliance on divisiveness as an excessive entanglement rationale is flawed. Not surpris-
ingly, then, the Court has slowly minimized the emphasis placed on the entanglement analysis.
50. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 634 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("As is often the
case, it is the effect of the statute, rather than its purpose, that creates Establishment Clause
problems .... ).
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ligious denomination or a religiously affiliated institution.51 In doing
so, the courts essentially disregard the benefits that the program pro-
vides the taxpayers and the citizenry, and instead they focus solely on
the religious aspect of the participating religious institution. Also un-
mentioned is the gravity of the harm to be eradicated by the coopera-
tive venture, such as illiteracy or immorality. Thus, even if the
government involvement with religion was deemed utterly essential to
the survival of the Nation, the Lemon test requires the courts to ig-
nore this fact when performing their Establishment Clause analysis.
Recently, more of these cooperative ventures are surviving judicial
scrutiny. When they do so, it is usually because they are facially neu-
tral and are applied according to religion-neutral criteria: they offer
aid to all institutions willing to participate in the program, regardless
of religion or lack thereof, assuming that the would-be participants
are qualified.52 Importantly, qualification is not based on the religious
persuasion of the institution. Despite this reliance on neutrality, as
Justice Byron White pointed out, "the line between state neutrality to
religion and state support of religion is not easy to locate," 53 at least
for some members of the judiciary. So even neutrality is no guarantee
that a program will survive the unpredictable sensibilities of activist
judges.
Another characteristic of Establishment Clause decisions worth
noting is that they are almost always close. 54 On the Court of Ap-
peals level, this means a host of two to one decisions;55 while in the
51. See, e.g., Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 479 (1972) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state program that reimbursed nonpublic schools for the cost of preparing examinations
and recordkeeping).
52. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion) (stating that "In distinguishing between indoc-
trination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently
turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion .... ); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994) ("[W]e have frequently relied explicitly on the general availa-
bility of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment
Clause challenges."); Ball, 473 U.S. at 382 (noting the Establishment Clause requires "the gov-
ernment to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreli-
gion."), overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("Neutrality is what is required."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("The government has an obligation of "benevolent neutrality.");
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The Establishment
Clause ensures government neutrality in matters of religion .....
53. Allen, 392 U.S. at 245-46.
54. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1741 (2000)
(stating, "The Supreme Court is presently split closely on almost all important issues of freedom
of religion and separation of church and state.").
55. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 945, petition for cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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Supreme Court, the vote is commonly five to four,56 with liberal Jus-
tices-who usually are not opposed to peculiar readings of the Consti-
tution in support of all other government programs-frequently
finding a violation of the Establishment Clause. 57 The inability to ob-
tain a clear consensus suggests both a jurisprudence that is in flux, and
perhaps one that is without a solid foundation. Recently, however,
beginning in the Reagan era, a series of cases has pushed judicial in-
terpretation of the Establishment Clause into a new, more cogent di-
rection. Although it is too soon to opine with any certainty, the Court
might slowly be gaining a consensus for an enduring Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
III. THE EVOLVING ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Bowen v. Kendrick58
In 1988, as Ronald Reagan was nearing the end of his second term,
the Reagan Revolution's effect on the United States Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence was finally being felt. 59 It was in this
era that the Court decided Bowen v. Kendrick, a five to four decision,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 60 Bowen involved a facial and
"as applied" challenge to the federal Adolescent Family Life Act,
which provided federal aid to organizations that worked to combat
teenage pregnancy and sexual promiscuity, and which provided assis-
56. This has led one observer to comment: "'The chief requirement for understanding the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the ability to count to five."' Richard John
Neuhaus, The Anatomy of a Controversy, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE CELEBRATED
FIRST THINGS DEBATED WITH ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON AND "THE ANATOMY OF A CON-
TROVERSEY" 175, 244 (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 1997).
57. The five to four decisions include the following: Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997);
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985), overruled, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1981); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646
(1980); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
58. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 589.
59. See generally, CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-
A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT (1991). By 1988, Reagan had been able to appoint Justice William
Rehnquist to the center chair, along with O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy as Associate Justices.
The 5-4 victories usually joined these four justices with Justice White, a moderate appointee of
President Kennedy. By the time Justice White retired, Justice Thomas replaced Justice
Thurgood Marshall, and assumed White's place in the conservative majority. Sometimes, how-
ever, Justice O'Connor elects to go her separate way. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by White,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; dissent by Blackmun, joined by Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter).
60. The dissenters were Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
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tance to pregnant teens. 61 Among the organizations the plaintiffs
found objectionable were religious organizations, including a Roman
Catholic order of nuns known as the Daughters of Charity62 and an
organization known as the Catholic Family Services. 63 Applying the
Lemon test, the district court held that the statute was unconstitu-
tional both facially and as applied, as its direct and immediate effect
was the advancement of religion and it necessarily entailed extensive
entanglement of government and religion.64
In analyzing the facial constitutionality of the program, the United
States Supreme Court also applied the Lemon test, but, demonstrating
how unpredictable the test is, the Court reached a completely differ-
ent conclusion than did the district court. As in most applications of
the test, the Court easily found that the program had an important
secular purpose: the prevention of premarital sex, along with the preg-
nancy, disease, and poverty that often follow. 65 The Court also made
explicit that the Act could not be invalidated under the purpose prong
simply because the goals of the statute coincided with the tenets of
particular religions.66 Were that the case, much of the United States
Code would fall prey to the Establishment Clause.
As in most Establishment Clause cases, the parties grappled over
the primary effect of the statute.67 Under this second prong of the
Lemon test, it was argued that the Act impermissibly elicits the in-
volvement of religious organizations, endorses religious solutions, and
funds religious groups, including "pervasively sectarian" organiza-
tions, whatever that means.68 As to the involvement of religious orga-
nizations, the Court reiterated that the Establishment Clause does not
prohibit the government from working with religion to eradicate secu-
lar problems.69 Decisions about whether religion might assist the gov-
ernment are to be left to the legislature and executive branch, not the
61. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593.
62. Bowen v. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1565 n.16 (D.D.C. 1987).
63. Id.
64. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. at 1563, 1570.
65. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602.
66. Id. at 604 n.8 (stating, "We also see no reason to conclude that the AFLA serves an imper-
missible religious purpose simply because some of the goals of the statue coincide with the be-
liefs of certain religious organizations.").
67. Id. at 604 (stating, "As usual in Establishment Clause cases .... the more difficult question
is whether the primary effect of the challenged statute is permissible.").
68. Id. at 606.
69. Id. at 609 (stating that "We note in addition that this Court has never held that religious
institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social
welfare programs.").
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courts.70 Congress determined that religious institutions might prove
useful in instilling family values essential to stem the tide of evils that
result from adolescent premarital sex.7' Although this government
program may have the effect of promoting religion, this effect is a
secondary one,72 and thus not prohibited by the Establishment Clause.
The Court also addressed the argument that the funding of religious
institutions necessarily had the primary effect of advancing religion.
Chief Justice Rehnquist first noted that religious organizations have
never been barred from receiving federal funds simply because they
are religious, despite ubiquitous rhetoric about the great wall that sep-
arates church and state.73 The Establishment Clause has never been
70. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 607.
71. Id. at 606-07 (stating, "these provisions of the statute reflect at most Congress' considered
judgment that religious organizations can help solve the problems to which the AFLA is
addressed.").
72. Id. at 607 (stating, "To the extent that this congressional recognition has any effect of
advancing religion, the effect is at most 'incidental and remote."').
73. Id. at 609 (stating, "[T]his Court has never held that religious institutions are disabled by
the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs."). See
also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), which involved government financial support of
the Catholic Indian Missions, which operated schools on Indian reservations. The government
paid the missionaries who also taught religion to the Indians with tax dollars from the Sioux
Trust Fund, which was created pursuant to a treaty with the Sioux Indians in exchange for land.
Reuben Quick Bear, a Sioux Indian, sought to enjoin the payment of the missionaries because in
1897, Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the payment of government funds to "sectarian
schools" as defined in the Act. Id. at 54. Notably, Quick Bear did not represent all Indians, as
many of them sought education at the missions and the better life that formal education might
entail. Id.
The Court held that the Commissioner of Indian Affairs could continue to fund the religious
schools despite the Establishment Clause and the statutes prohibiting government funding of
religious missions to the Indians. As to the statutory prohibitions, the Court held that these
applied only to general government funds, and not the government funds previously placed in
trust for the Indians. Id. at 77. These trust funds, because they belonged to the Indians, could be
used as the Indians saw fit. Id. at 81. Because many of them sought education at religious
schools, the Court held that they should not be denied the opportunity to have the Commis-
sioner expend their funds for that purpose.
As to the Establishment Clause, Quick Bear did not waste his time even attempting to argue
that payment to the religious schools violated this provision. Id. at 81. The Court noted that
such contention would have been futile in light of Bradfield. But equally futile was the argu-
ment, which the plaintiff did make, that the "spirit of the Constitution" requires that such fund-
ing be prohibited "on the ground that the actions of the United States were to always be
undenominational, and that, therefore, the government can never act in a sectarian capacity,
either in the use of its own funds or in that of the funds of others . I..." Id. at 81. Although the
Court did not reject this argument as constitutionally erroneous-instead it held that no such
principles govern the Indians in their use of their own funds-the Court obviously was not much
enamored with it.
This case contains a few points relevant to government funding of school vouchers. First, the
Quick Bear Court saw nothing unconstitutional about the government providing funds to relig-
ious missionaries, even though the inculcation of religion was the focus of their mission. The
Court noted that the government had funded Catholic missions to the Indians since at least 1819.
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understood to be that restrictive. "[R]eligious institutions need not be
quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all."'74
They are entitled to compete with secular institutions for federal funds
without violating the Establishment Clause, so long as one religion is
not preferred over another. That is, the government must be neutral
among religions-not favoring, say, Lutherans over Catholics. When
religious organizations receive funding, then, the relevant question
will always be whether other similarly situated groups were intention-
ally excluded from receiving funds.7 5 If not, there is no violation of
Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 56 n.1 (quoting defendant's Answer, 1 12). "From the history of appro-
priations of public moneys for education of Indians ... it appears that before 1895 the govern-
ment, for a number of years, had made contracts for sectarian schools for the education of the
Indians, and the money due on these contracts was paid ... from the 'Tribal Funds' and from the
gratuitous public appropriations." Id. at 78.
It is also apparent that in the 1890s Congress (or at least a majority of Congressmen) never
believed that the Establishment Clause prohibited the funding of religious schools, as its enact-
ment of the statute at issue in Quick Bear had this very effect. This suggests that the discrimina-
tory interpretation of the Establishment Clause and the extent of its prohibition is a relatively
recent phenomenon, which as of 1908 had not yet reared its ugly head. More importantly, Quick
Bear stands for the proposition that tax dollars may be used to fund religious schools without
violating the First Amendment. As with most issues, if the citizenry is opposed to the funding of
religious schools-as some people apparently were in the 1890s-their remedy is through legisla-
tion, not constitutional litigation. "The Constitution does not resolve all difficult social ques-
tions, but leaves the vast majority of them to resolution by debate and the democratic process
.... " Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1296 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); ROB-
ERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DE-
CLINE 173 (1996) ("The Constitution" leaves "most subjects to the judgment and moral sense of
the American people and their elected representatives."). If the Establishment Clause did not
bar the Indians from being able to send their children to a religious school of their choice, it
likewise should not be held to bar anyone else from doing the same.
74. Bowen, 487 US. at 608 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736,
746 (1976)).
75. Of course, it is often difficult to discern a legislature's motives for enacting a statute, even
when certain legislator's offer their own personal motives for supporting a particular provision.
"A legislature is not a single mind, and the determination of collective intent is often problem-
atic ...." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 251
(1988). For starters, "[liegislation is frequently the product of compromises that are not readily
apparent to the judiciary." Aubert v. Am. Gen. Fin., 137 F.3d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1998). One
legislator's reasons for supporting a statute might not be the same as another's motives. Judge
Easterbrook has opined:
Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads of legislators and you find a hodgepodge. Some
strive to serve the public interest, but they disagree about where that lies. Some strive
for re-election, catering to the interest groups and contributors. Most do a little of
each. An inside some heads you would find only fantasies challenging the disciples of
Sigmund Freud. Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a collective body. The
different strands produce quite a playground-they give judges discretion, but no
'meaning' that can be imputed to the legislature.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1993) (footnote omitted). Finally, Lon Fuller stated:
We tend to think of intention as a phenomenon of individual psychology, though what
we are interpreting is a corporate act. Thus we ask after the intention of 'the legislator,'
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the Establishment Clause. To use the lingo of employment discrimi-
nation law to establish a violation of the Establishment Clause, there
must be disparate treatment in awarding the government funds.76 In
making this disparate treatment analysis, the Court must first look at
the face of the statute, 77 and then it must consider the actual distribu-
tion of funds. 78 But a mere disparate impact-where one group coin-
cidentally but unintentionally receives a greater quality or quantity of
government aid-is not sufficient to state a claim under the Establish-
ment Clause. 79 The only way to protect against such an outcome is for
governments to intentionally discriminate against religion, which
would violate the Free Exercise Clause. As with other constitutional
provisions, like the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
though we know that there is no such being. At other times we speak of the intention
of 'the legislature,' though we know that those who voted for a statute often do so with
a variety of views as to its meaning and often with no real understanding of its terms.
Moving closer to individual psychology we may speak of the intention of 'the drafts-
men.' But again we are in trouble. There may be a number of draftsmen, acting at
different times and without any common understanding as to the exact purpose sought.
Furthermore, any private and uncommunicated intention of the draftsmen of a statute
is properly regarded as legally irrelevant to its proper interpretation.
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 86 (1964) (footnote omitted).
76. "Disparate treatment 'occurs when a plaintiff is intentionally treated less favorably than
others simply because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'" Bragg v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Co., 164 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1998). Under a disparate treatment theory, there is no
violation of the law absent an intent to discriminate. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.). In a disparate treatment case, a plaintiff must do more
than show that the employer was aware of adverse consequences a particular group would suffer.
"The plaintiff must show that the employer chose the particular policy because of its effect on
members of a protected class." Id. at 1405. The other side of the coin is that showing a disparate
impact is not enough. Thus, a government program that results in ninety percent of the funds
going to Lutheran organizations does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it is shown
that the government intentionally excluded other religions, including the religion known as "non-
religion."
77. For example, a statute would violate the Establishment Clause on its face if it said that
only Unitarian Universalists could participate.
78. For instance, there could be an "as applied" violation of the Establishment Clause if it was
shown that a government official intentionally excluded a certain religion from participating in
the program. In Hunt v. McNair, the plaintiffs brought an "as applied" challenge to a South
Carolina statute that provided for the issuance of revenue bonds for the construction of new
schools. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). They conceded that the statute itself was constitutional, but ar-
gued that it violated the Establishment Clause to the extent that bonds were issued to fund the
construction of religiously-affiliated schools. Id.
79. "Disparate impact claims, recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct.
849, 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1971), do not require proof of intent to discriminate. Instead, they focus
on facially neutral employment practices that create such statistical disparities disadvantaging
members of a protected group they are 'functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.'"
Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988)).
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Eighth Amendment80 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,81 only intentional violations of the Establishment
Clause are actionable. Here, however, the Court held that the statute
was facially neutral, in the sense that "the aid is made available re-
gardless of whether it will ultimately flow to a secular or sectarian
institution,' 8 2 and any claim that certain religions were intentionally
preferred over others was undeveloped. As later cases demonstrate,
facial neutrality will often be the key to a program's constitutionality,
as it was here.
Continuing the analysis under the "primary effect" prong, the Court
addressed the plaintiffs' argument that the program must be invali-
dated because a substantial number of the participants were "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions. In previous cases, this label had been
the death knell for government aid programs, 83 based on the rationale
that there is a greater danger that government funds will be used to
advance the religious mission of pervasively sectarian institutions, as
opposed to institutions that were just somewhat sectarian. 84 Consis-
tent with its previous decisions, the Court mentioned that government
aid could have the effect of advancing religion if it were given to an
institution that is "pervasively sectarian." 85
Of course, even when the challenged statute appears to be neutral
on its face, we have always been careful to ensure that direct gov-
ernment aid to religiously affiliated institutions does not have the
primary effect of advancing religion. One way in which direct gov-
ernment aid might have that effect is if the aid flows to institutions
that are "pervasively sectarian. '86
The Court ambiguously defined a "pervasively sectarian" institution
as "an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial
portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission. '87
Under this definition, many religious institutions-from social service
agencies, to poverty relief organizations, hospitals, and universities-
80. The Eighth Amendment only proscribes the "wanton infliction of pain" by prison officials
or deliberate indifference to medical needs. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
81. The "equal protection clause is violated only by intentional discrimination." Am. Nurses'
Ass'n v. State of Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976)).
82. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609.
83. See, eg., Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
84. "'Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it
flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions
are subsumed in the religious mission .... ' Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610 (quoting Hunt, 413 U.S. at
743).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 609-10.
87. Id. at 610 (quoting Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743).
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qualify as "pervasively sectarian." Other than noting that the pro-
grams at issue in previous decisions like Aguilar v. Felton and Grand
Rapids v. Ball, which involved pervasively sectarian grammar
schools, 88 no examples were given. So it is hard to say when an insti-
tution is "pervasively sectarian," especially because Aguilar and Ball
were subsequently overruled by the Court. 89 Of course, the reasoning
behind the "pervasively sectarian" analysis is flawed, but rather than
explicitly stating this, the Bowen Court held that such dangers did not
exist here because only about a quarter of the participating institu-
tions were pervasively sectarian, 90 in contrast to, say, Grand Rapids v.
Ball,91 where almost all of the challenged aid flowed to parochial
88. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 411 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997). Aguilar v. Felton was a companion case to Ball. Just as in Ball, the Court's opinion was
written by Justice Brennan, and as with Ball, the Court held that the program violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. At issue in Aguilar was a New York program that used federal funds to send
public school teacher into private schools to offer remedial courses. Recognizing that education
is often the only legal way out of poverty, the New York program offered special educational
services to children that were educationally deprived and who lived in poverty-stricken areas.
Eighty-four percent of the private school students eligible to participate in the program attended
Roman Catholic schools, which also taught religious subjects, but of course not with government
money or instructors. Id. at 406.
Although the New York program was similar to the ones at issue in Ball, it differed in one
material respect: in an effort to ensure compliance with the Establishment Clause, the school
district adopted a system of monitoring to ensure that no religious content entered the programs.
Id. at 409. Ball demonstrates that the failure to implement a strict monitoring scheme to prevent
the inculcation of religion will result in the Court presuming that religion will be taught, or at
least promoted, and on that basis finding the program unconstitutional. Aguilar, on the other
hand, demonstrates that implementing Establishment Clause safeguards will simply result in the
Court finding another ground to invalidate the program, namely, that monitoring entangles gov-
ernment and religious schools. Id.
As explained by the Court, the "excessive entanglement" prong of Lemon is rooted in con-
cerns about the ultimate no-win situation. By having public and religious employees coordinate
teaching schedules and monitor teachers (1) the freedom of religious belief of those who don't
adhere to the entangled religion "suffers" and (2) adherents to the entangled religion lose by
having their freedom of religion "limited" by the entanglement. Id. at 409-10. Because the
schools were "pervasively sectarian," the cooperation of state employees and private school em-
ployees would somehow start a cataclysmic reaction that would result in the wholesale destruc-
tion of religious freedom. Luckily, the Court stepped in and this disaster was averted. Of course,
the Court did not explain exactly how this disaster would have occurred or how it knew that such
as disaster would strike. As in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, a record addressing these
points apparently is not necessary. Of course, Aguilar is also like Ball in that the Court's reason-
ing is unintelligible, which probably contributed to the Court's subsequent decision to abandon it
in Agostini v. Felton. Miraculously, Agostini has not yet resulted in the constitutional tragedy
predicted by Justice Brennan.
89. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
90. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610 (stating that "In this lawsuit, nothing on the face of the AFLA
indicates that a significant proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to 'pervasively secta-
rian' institutions.").
91. Ball, 473 U.S. at 373.
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schools.92 Later, in Mitchell v. Helms, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined
the plurality that recognized the defective reasoning behind the "per-
vasively sectarian" distinction, 93 but in 1988, the Court was not yet
ready to explicitly acknowledge this.
Importantly, the Bowen Court also departed from previous cases by
holding that it would not presume that pervasively sectarian institu-
tions will use government funds to proselytize. 94 In effect, the Court
held that the burden of proving proselytization rests on the parties
asserting it, and that they would enjoy no presumption of unconstitu-
tionality. The Court made clear that no facial challenge will lie where
the only harm is that pervasively sectarian institutions might receive
some of the government money.95
As to the third prong of Lemon, whether there is an excessive en-
tanglement with religion, the Court noted that the disbursement of
government money would almost always entail some government
monitoring, and thus some "entanglement" with religion.96 To the
Court, at least, this monitoring was not a particularly extensive entan-
glement and certainly not enough to warrant invalidation of the pro-
gram.97 If religious institutions are to be as free as secular groups to
compete for government funds, there must be some government over-
sight that does not violate the Establishment Clause, and the Court
thought that the Secretary of Health and Human Services had
achieved a reasonable balance of religious freedom and government
supervision. The alternative would be to exclude all religiously affili-
ated organizations, which would undoubtedly violate the Free Exer-
cise clause.
Because the Court found that the statute survived a facial challenge
under all three prongs of the Lemon Test, it reversed the district court
on its finding of facial unconstitutionality. As to the as applied chal-
lenge, the Court found that the record could not support the district
92. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11.
93. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
94. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612 (stating that "nothing in our prior cases warrants the presumption
adopted by the District Court that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carry-
ing out their functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner.").
95. Id.
96. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615 (stating that "[t]here is no doubt that the monitoring of AFLA
grants is necessary if the Secretary is to ensure that public money is to be spent in the way that
Congress intended and in a way that comports with the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, this
litigation presents us with yet another 'Catch-22' argument: the very supervision of the aid to
assure that it does not further religion renders the statue invalid").
97. Id. at 616 (noting that there is no reason "to fear that the less intensive monitoring in-
volved here will cause the Government to intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the
religiously affiliated AFLA grantees.").
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court's holding, so it reversed and remanded that portion of the dis-
trict court's opinion with guidance as to how the district court should
proceed. Although the Rehnquist-led Court made great strides to-
wards a workable Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it was still
handicapped by its reliance on the Lemon test, and its failure to ex-
plicitly renounce the idea that "pervasively sectarian" organizations
were constitutionally suspect.
B. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 98
In 1993, the Rehnquist Court continued its rehabilitation of the Re-
ligion Clauses in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District. Zobrest
differs from the usual Establishment Clause cases in that the govern-
ment is the party asserting the Establishment Clause as a defense for
its discrimination against religion.99 James Zobrest was a student at a
Catholic high school who required the assistance of a sign language
interpreter.'00 When the Catalina Foothills School District refused to
provide one, Zobrest's parents sued under the Individuals with Disa-
bilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause. 01 The
School District defended its decision by claiming that assigning an in-
terpreter to a Catholic school, where he would be required to trans-
late the contents of both secular and religious classes, would violate
the Establishment Clause because it would impermissibly aid religion
and entangle religion and the state. 0 2 Both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit accepted these arguments and held that the school dis-
trict acted properly in refusing assistance to the Zobrest family, 10 3
even though the Zobrest family would have received state assistance if
James had attended a private school not affiliated with the Catholic
Church or some other religion.
98. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1.
99. In most other Establishment Clause cases, the plaintiffs assert the Establishment Clause to
attack government action. See, e.g., Aguitar, 473 U.S. at 411, overruled in Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997). But Zobrest is certainly not the only defensive use of the Establishment Clause
by various government entitites hoping to protect their discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Ro-
senberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (Establishment
Clause was no defense to viewpoint discrimination); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 598 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993) (holding that school district could not discriminate
against local church group that wanted to use school property and that the Establishment Clause
was no defense, as the Establishment Clause does not require discrimination against religion).
100. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
102. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4.
103. Id. at 5.
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In another five to four opinion penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the United States Supreme Court reversed.' 0 4 In doing so, the Lemon
test was noticeably absent,'10 5 except where the Court mentioned that
the district court found an impermissible entanglement, while a di-
vided panel of the Ninth Circuit focused on the primary effect of al-
lowing an interpreter in a Catholic school.'0 6 The absence of the
Lemon test is quite remarkable when one considers the "entangle-
ment" of government and religion that the Zobrest family was re-
questing, which was a substantial entanglement by the Court's
previous standards. Long criticized,10 7 the Court would later state in
Agostini v. Felton'0 8 and Mitchell v. Helms 09 that excessive entangle-
104. Id. at 3, 14.
105. This case, along with several others, led to speculation in the academic community that
the Lemon test was dead. Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1709, 1723 (2000) (stating that "[Tihe Court has implicitly abandoned the Lemon test for the
validity of enactments under the Establishment Clause, and has instead adopted an approach
championed by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor-the 'endorsement' test.") (footnote omitted).
The federal courts of appeals, however, continue to utilize the test. See, e.g., Am. Family Ass'n,
Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2002); Indiana Civil
Liberties Union v. O'Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 2001). Justice Scalia has put forth a
compelling explanation for the Court's sporadic use, and later abandonment, of the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again .... The secret of the Lemon test's survival, I
think, is that it is so easy to kill. It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish
to do so, but we cannot command it to return to the tomb at will. When we wish to
strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it
forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes we take a middle course, calling the three
prongs "no more than helpful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth
keeping around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need
him.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:
How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 113 (1993) (the Justices
"simply ignored the rules of Lemon v. Kurtzman when applying them might prove too
disruptive").
106. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 5.
107. Justice White, among others, often questioned the wisdom and origin of the "excessive
entanglement" prong of Lemon. Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976)
(White, J., concurring) (stating, "I have never understood the constitutional foundation for this
added element; it is at once both insolubly paradoxical, and as the Court had conceded from the
outset, a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier."') (internal citations omitted). Despite its
apocryphal foundation, the danger of creating an impermissible entanglement was the center-
piece of the dissent's arguments against the program. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (stating, "This case ... involves ongoing, daily, and intimate governmental participa-
tion in the teaching and propagation of religious doctrine.").
108. As the Court stated in Agostini,
Regardless of how we have characterized the issue, however, the factors we use to
assess whether an entanglement is "excessive" are similar to the factors we use to ex-
amine "effect." That is, to assess entanglement, we have looked to "the character and
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ment is simply one means of assessing whether a program has the pri-
mary effect of advancing religion, and thus that its decisions will place
less weight on any "entanglement" of government with religion. So
the Zobrest opinion may be seen to presage the development of this
principle.
Instead of focusing on Lemon, the Court considered whether the
program was neutral with respect to religion, whether any aid to relig-
ion was the result of government action or parental choice, and
whether funds were paid directly to the religious school. With respect
to neutrality, the Court had no trouble perceiving that the program
was completely neutral with respect to the religion of the child or the
religious or non-religious nature of the school he attended. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote, "The service at issue in this case is part of a
general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any
child qualifying as 'disabled' under the IDEA, without regard to the
'sectarian-non-sectarian or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the
child attends."' 10 As in Bowen, because the government did not in-
tentionally discriminate in favor of or against a particular religion in
either enacting the IDEA or in applying it, the program cleared the
first hurdle erected by the Establishment Clause. The fact that the
program was presently benefiting only a child in a Catholic school
made no difference to the Court, because no discrimination for or
against religion was shown.
As to the decision maker behind James's attendance, and therefore
the interpreter's presence, at a religious school, the Court noted that
this responsibility rested solely on the shoulders of the Zobrests. The
purpose of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State pro-
vides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority.
Similarly, we have assessed a law's "effect" by examining the character of the institu-
tions benefited e.g., whether the religious institutions were "predominantly religious,"
and the nature of the aid that the State provided e.g., whether it was neutral and non-
ideological .... Thus, it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and
treat it-as we did in Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect.
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33 (citations omitted).
109. Justice Thomas wrote for the plurality:
Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statue (1) has a secular purpose, (2)
has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive en-
tanglement between government and religion, in Agostini we modified Lemon for pur-
poses of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors. We
acknowledged that our cases discussing the excessive entanglement had applied many
of the same considerations as had our cases discussing primary effect, and we therefore
recast Lemon's entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a
statute's effect. We also acknowledged that our cases had pared somewhat the factors
that could justify a finding of excessive entanglement.
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807-08 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
10. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10.
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government did nothing to encourage the Zobrests to send their son
to a Catholic school and, indeed, attempted to discourage this by de-
nying him the funds necessary for an interpreter, a privilege he would
have enjoyed at a public school. The Court found this important be-
cause it meant that the government did not elect to assist Catholic
schools or Catholic school students. Assuming that assigning an inter-
preter to translate religious speech would constitute conduct "respect-
ing an establishment of a religion," it was not immediately attributable
to a state actor and thus could not violate the Establishment Clause.
As the Court observed,
By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the
statue ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in
a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individ-
ual parents. In other words, because the IDEA creates no financial
incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's
presence there cannot be attributed to state decision making. 1 '
The Court also mentioned in its analysis that none of the funds were
ever paid to the Catholic school, which further suggests that there was
no impermissible aid to religion. The direct beneficiary of the pro-
gram was James Zobrest, whose parents were presumably rational
maximizers who perceived an educational benefit to their son attend-
ing a private school.112 By ensuring that James could understand his
teacher, the interpreter was assisting James in fulfilling his educational
dreams. The Catholic school benefited from the arrangement, but
only tangentially: because the Zobrests did not have to pay for an
interpreter out of their own pocket, they had more capital to utilize
for tuition. Therefore, if they could not afford both a private school
education and an interpreter, the Catholic school would have lost
James as a pupil. As the Court stated,
[U]nder the IDEA, no funds traceable to the government ever find
their way into sectarian schools' coffers. The only indirect eco-
nomic benefit a sectarian school might receive by dint of the IDEA
is the disabled child's tuition-and that is of course, assuming that
the school makes a profit on each student; that, without an IDEA
111. Id. at 10. Notice that the Court referred to the school as "sectarian," as opposed to
"pervasively sectarian," and adjective used to describe similar schools in previous cases. This is
further evidence of the Court's attempt to distance itself from the errors of the past, including its
paranoia relating to "pervasively sectarian" institutions.
112. The Zobrests were typical Americans in that respect, since a "majority of American par-
ents say they would send their children to private schools rather than public schools if they could
afford it .... STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS TRIVIALIZES RELIGION 195 (1993). Vouchers are one means by which parents can
fulfill their desire to give their children a sound education.
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interpreter, the child would have gone to school elsewhere; and that
the school, then, would have been unable to fill that child's spot.
113
Bringing together the four themes of (1) neutrality, (2) independent
choice, (3) a disregard for the pervasiveness of religion at the institu-
tion, and (4) the mere incidental benefit to religion, the Court ob-
served the following in a remark highly applicable to voucher
programs: "government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not
readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sec-
tarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."
114
Two years later, the Court would draw on some of these same princi-
ples to uphold the right of students with a religious viewpoint to ob-
tain the same opportunities provided other students at the University
of Virginia.
C. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia' 1 5
Rosenberger involved the funding of a Christian student publication
at the University of Virginia. Through a student activities fund, the
school provided money to produce student periodicals. 116 The Uni-
versity, however, refused to provide financial support for the publica-
tion of Wide Awake, a magazine with a Christian viewpoint, based on
its policy against funding any material related to religion.117 When
Christian students complained about this discrimination, the Univer-
sity asserted as a defense its duty to comply with the Establishment
Clause. 118 In light of the morass created by conflicting Establishment
Clause decisions, one could almost understand the University's policy:
better to stay clear of religion than to get involved in First Amend-
ment litigation. In contrast, perhaps the University viewed religious
speech as less worthy of funding than other forms of speech. Either
way, the Establishment Clause proved to be no defense.
In yet another five to four decision, authored by Justice Anthony
Kennedy, the Court again neglected to consider the University's ac-
tions in light of the Lemon test. Instead, much like Zobrest, it focused
on the following: (1) the neutrality of the program; (2) the private
choice behind the funding decision; and (3) the fact that the benefit to
113. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-11.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
116. Id. at 823.
117. Id. at 826.
118. Id. at 838.
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religion was only incidental to the government's provision of secular
services. Also key was the Court's unstated decision not to consider
the "pervasively sectarian" nature of the speech relevant to the Estab-
lishment Clause analysis. With these key features, the Court rejected
the notion that the Establishment Clause required the University to
discriminate against religious publications in awarding funds. 119
The Establishment Clause prohibits intentional government dis-
crimination, yet the University of Virginia refused to fund any publi-
cation that "promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a
deity or an ultimate reality. ' 120 The key to the decision was the fact
that the University's publication program was capable of distributing
funds in a religion-neutral manner: "A central lesson of our decisions
is that a significant factor in upholding government programs in the
face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards relig-
ion."' 121 Neutrality means that the government is not favoring one re-
ligion over another. The Court noted that the program, as designed,
was neutral with respect to religion; indeed, its object was to fund stu-
dent speech generally, not religious speech or the opinions of any par-
ticular religion. 122 "There is no suggestion that the University created
it to advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with the pur-
pose of aiding a religious cause. '123
Because anyone could apply for the funds (as in Bowen and
Zobrest) and, indeed, a variety of secular groups were financed by the
University, there was no preference given to a particular religion or
even religion generally, and the funding of any publication was the
product of private, not government, choice. Because any funding of
religious viewpoints was the product of private choice (as in Zobrest,),
it could not directly be ascribable to the government and there could
be no violation of the Establishment Clause. It is true that the relig-
ious viewpoint of the students would be transmitted at government
expense (as in Zobrest), and thus religion benefited from any money it
secured from the University. This benefit to religion, however, was
"incidental to the government provision of secular services for secular
purposes on a religion-neutral basis."'1 24 Therefore, the Court rejected
119. Id.
120. Id. at 825.
121. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
122. Id. at 840 ("The governmental program here is neutral toward religion. There is no sug-
gestion that the University created it to advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with
the purpose of aiding a religious cause.").
123. Id.
124. Id. at 843-44.
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the University's argument that the Establishment Clause would be vi-
olated were it to fund religious publications.
With respect to student vouchers, Rosenberger (along with Bowen
and Zobrest) suggests that government funding of religious organiza-
tions that advance a particular religious viewpoint is not prohibited by
the Establishment Clause so long as the money is awarded on a relig-
ion-neutral basis. 125 Because voucher programs can easily be de-
signed to meet this requirement, it is a foregone conclusion that at
least some voucher programs can withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny. This becomes even more obvious when one considers the
holding of Agostini v. Felton, where the Court finally renounced some
of its most egregious errors with respect to the Religion Clauses.
D. Agostini v. Felton 26
In Agostini, another five to four decision authored by Justice
O'Connor, 127 the Court made explicit what had become apparent to
many: Its Establishment Clause jurisprudence had undergone such a
transformation that some of its earlier Establishment Clause decisions
could not be squared with its more recent holdings. 128 Agostini in-
volved a federally funded remedial education program that sent public
school teachers into Catholic schools located in low-income areas, a
practice that the Court held unconstitutional twelve years earlier in
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball129 and Aguilar v. Felton.130
125. Id. at 839 ("A central lesion of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards
religion.").
126. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
127. The dissents were written or joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id.
at 240. These Justices are the same Justices who dissented in Rosenberger. 515 U.S. at 863.
128. At the same time, the new jurisprudence was consistent with the Court's earliest under-
standing of the Establishment Clause. See Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 291; Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 50.
129. Ball, 473 U.S. at 373, overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). Ball
involved remedial and enrichment programs for students at private schools, most of which were
Roman Catholic schools. Id. at 375. Two programs were involved. The Shared Time program
involved public school teachers teaching remedial math and reading, and enrichment math, read-
ing, art, music, and physical education for private school students on the premises of the private
schools. Id. The second program, the Community Education program, involved courses, such as
arts and crafts, Spanish, gymnastics and chess. Id. at 376. The classes were taught at the relig-
ious schools by part-time public school employees after regular school hours. Under both pro-
grams, the school district leased the classrooms from the private schools for $6 per week. Id. at
377. Although both programs involved only private schools, the record showed that the
equivalent courses were taught at public schools. Id.
After a bench trial, the district court granted the objecting taxpayers an injunction barring the
school district from funding the programs. Both the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed.
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the Court held the programs unconstitutional, based
solely on the possibility that the programs might result in the promotion of religion. Id. at 385.
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The Court implicitly recognized that the Ball and Aguilar decisions
lacked a substantial foundation even when they were decided.' 31
These decisions were questioned at their inception, and slowly eroded
and disregarded by subsequent decisions. 32
Ball and Aguilar were based on several beliefs: (1) placing public
school teachers on the premises of religious schools would result in
their promotion of religion (i.e., the teachers would conform their in-
struction to the tenets of the particular religion); 33 (2) the presence of
public school teachers at religious schools creates a perception that
the state is endorsing the particular religion or is working in concert
with it;13 4 (3) the remedial education indirectly assists the schools in
their religious mission by educating students in secular subjects;135 and
(4) the program created an entanglement with religion because the
government needed to monitor the remedial teachers because other-
wise they would teach religious doctrine. 136 Building on Zobrest-
where the Court held that it would not presume that the translator
would improperly disseminate religious speech while serving in the
Catholic high school' 37-and Bowen-in which the Court held that it
would no longer presume that pervasively sectarian institutions will
Although the Court purported to apply the "primary effect" prong of the Lemon test, in fact, the
Court speculated that three evils might arise: (1) the teachers might intentionally or inadver-
tently inculcate religious beliefs; (2) the programs could cause some people to perceive that
government endorses the particular religions taught at the schools; and (3) the programs might
provide a subsidy to the religious mission of the institutions. Id. at 383, 385. The Court never
held that these dangers were the "primary effect" of the program, just that these dangers might
arise. Indeed, Justice Brennan candidly admitted that there was no evidence that any of these
dangers ever occurred. Id. at 388 (stating, "The Court of Appeals of course recognized that
respondents adduced no evidence of specific incidents of religious indoctrination in this case.").
When the Court wants to find a violation of the Establishment Clause "the absence of proof of
specific incidents is not dispositive." Id. at 388. In light of these evidentiary flaws and the poor
reasoning used to create nonexistent Establishment Clause evils, it is not surprising that the
Court subsequently overruled Ball. Under the Court's present practice of not assuming that
public employees will violate the Establishment Clause and its emphasis on the "primary effect"
rather than possible secondary affects of government aid, the reasoning of Ball could not stand.
See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Allen, 392 U.S. at 236.
130. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402, overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
131. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 220 (noting that the Ball "Court disregarded the lack of evidence of
any specific incidents of religious indoctrination as largely irrelevant").
132. Id. at 222.
133. Id. at 219.
134. Id. at 220.
135. Id. at 220.
136. Id. at 222.
137. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13 ("Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language interpreter
would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the class as a whole.
In fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to transmit everything that is said in exactly the
same way it was intended.") (internal quotations omitted).
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use government funds to proselytize 138-the Agostini Court similarly
rejected these broad presumptions that assistance to religious schools
would necessarily result in government funding of religious speech. 139
Because the paranoia behind the presumptions has no bounds, it is
not surprising that the Court rejected it. Thus, the Court will not pre-
sume that unsupervised public employees will, contrary to instruc-
tions, overtly promote religion if left unattended in a private school.
A litigant must, as part of his Establishment Clause case, demonstrate
that this has occurred.
[W]e have abandoned the presumption erected in Meek and Ball
that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds
inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored in-
doctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government
and religion. 140
Zobrest also implicitly repudiated another assumption on which
Ball and Aguilar turned: that the presence of a public employee on
private school property creates an impermissible 'symbolic link' be-
tween government and religion.' 4'
[W]e have departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all govern-
ment aid that directly assists the educational function of religious
schools is invalid' 42
138. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612 ("nothing in our prior cases warrants the presumption adopted by
the District Court that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their
functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner").
139. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234 ("But after Zobrest, we no longer presume that public
employees will inculcate religion simply religion simply because they happen to be in a sectarian
environment."); Compare Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). In Levitt,
the Court found New York's practice of paying private schools to create and administer state
mandated tests and to report student attendance levels unconstitutional. Chief Justice Burger
authored the short opinion, and Justice White was the sole dissenter. The Court purported to
apply the Lemon test to the program. It had no problem finding a secular purpose; the defect
was the possibility that the funds could be used to inculcate religion. The Court reasoned, "We
cannot ignore the substantial risk that these examinations, prepared by teachers under the au-
thority of religious institutions, will be drafted with an eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to incul-
cate students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring church." Id. at 480. Thus, because there
were inadequate safeguards against state-funded indoctrination, the Court held the program to
constitute an impermissible aid to religion. Thus, under Levitt, the mere possibility that govern-
ment funds might be used for a religious purpose was enough to doom a program. It is not
surprising that the Court later distanced itself from this view in Agostini v. Felton, at least with
respect to public employees operating in religious schools. The Court held in Agostini that it will
not presume that unsupervised public employees will, contrary to instructions, overtly promote
religion if left unattended in a private school.
140. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223.
141. Id. at 224.
142. Id. at 225.
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Since we have abandoned the assumption that properly instructed
public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully, we
must also discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring of Title
I teachers is required. There is no suggestion in the record before
us that unannounced monthly visits of public supervisors are insuffi-
cient to prevent or to detect inculcation of religion by public
employees.1 43
Central to the Court's holding of constitutionality was the neutrality
of the program at issue: the "aid is provided to students at whatever
school they choose to attend. 1 44 Thus, the government program does
not discriminate on the basis of where parents choose to send their
children. The government remained completely neutral on the issue
of school choice, but once that decision was made by the parents, the
government did not penalize them for sending their children to a relig-
ious school. The Court specifically declined to place any emphasis on
the number of religious students who benefited from the program;1 45
thus, a program that benefits only religious school students, so long as
there is no intentional discrimination against other students, does not
violate the Establishment Clause. 146
The Court modified the excessive entanglement analysis of Lemon
for the better. It recognized that the entanglement question is closely
related to the effect question, so that the two are sometimes insepara-
ble. Accordingly, the Court announced that it would henceforth ask
(1) whether a church-state entanglement is "excessive"1 47 and (2)
whether it has the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.1 48
Without a showing of these two elements, the program will be held
constitutional.1 49 Furthermore, the fact that a program requires "ad-
ministrative cooperation" between the government and a school or
might increase the danger of political divisiveness1 50 does not mean
143. Id. at 234.
144. Id. at 228.
145. Id. at 229 (noting, "Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid
program depends on the number of sectarian school students who happen to receive the other-
wise neutral aid.").
146. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229-30.
147. Id. at 233 (stating that "[e]ntanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the
Establishment Clause.").
148. Id. (stating that "it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat it-
as we did in Walz-as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute's effect").
149. id. (noting that "[t]he pre-Aguilar Title I program does not result in an 'excessive' entan-
glement that advances or inhibits religion.").
150. Agostini, however, apparently did not dissuade adherents of the divisiveness analysis
from using this weapon in the barrage against religion practices. For example, Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, opined that the mecha-
nism used by the school district to select a student to present the invocation before football
games "encourages divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting, a result at odds
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that the program necessarily fosters excessive entanglement that ad-
vances religion. Rather, these are simply two factors to be considered
in the analysis. Because the advancement of religion was not the pri-
mary effect of the program, the Court reversed the precedent it had
set in Aguilar and Ball and held that the program did not violate the
Establishment Clause.1 5' The Supreme Court would further build on
these principles as its Establishment Clause jurisprudence continued
to evolve in Mitchell v. Helms.
E. Mitchell v. Helms1 52
Mitchell involved a school aid program, known as Chapter 2,153 by
which the federal government distributes funds to state and local gov-
ernments that in turn lend educational materials and equipment to
public and private schools.' 54 The equipment includes reference
materials, computer hardware and software, and other educational
materials. For example, in Mitchell, the private schools used Chapter
2 funds to acquire library books, computers, slide and movie projec-
tors, maps, globes, and videocassette recorders. 55 Under Chapter 2,
the amount of aid received by private schools depends on the number
of children enrolled in each school. 156 To obtain aid, the private
school must submit an application to a local agency detailing the items
sought and the way in which the materials will be used. 157 The type of
aid provided to private schools is restricted. 158 Specifically, the mater-
ials provided must be "secular, neutral, and nonideological," and the
private schools are prohibited from acquiring Chapter 2 funds or title
to materials purchased with the funds. 159 Most of the schools partici-
pating in the program addressed in Mitchell were affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church, which resulted in an Establishment Clause
challenge to the program. 160
with the Establishment Clause." Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311
(2000). For a good discussion of the "divisiveness" question, see generally Edward McGlynn
Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in
Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 S'r. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980).
151. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35.
152. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793 (plurality opinion). The plurality consisted of Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id.
153. "Chapter 2" is now codified as Subchapter VI of Chapter 70 of 20 U.S.C. Mitchell, 530
U.S. at 801 n.1 (plurality opinion).
154. Id. at 801.
155. Id. at 803.
156. Id. at 802
157. Id. at 803.
158. Id. at 802.
159. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802.
160. Id. at 803-4.
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In addressing this challenge, the Mitchell plurality noted that there
was no suggestion that the program had an impermissible purpose;
rather, the only complaint was that it had the impermissible effect of
advancing religion. 161 The Court assessed this argument under the
three primary criteria used in Agostini: (1) whether the government
aid results in government indoctrination; (2) whether it defines recipi-
ents by reference to religion; and (3) whether it creates an excessive
entanglement of religion and government.162
Under this framework, the Mitchell plurality found the concept of
government neutrality to be particularly important, especially with re-
spect to judging whether there was any governmental indoctrination
involved.1 63 Awarding governmental assistance on a religion-neutral
basis usually ensures that a government program does not place the
government in a position that supports any indoctrination. 64 Closely
connected to neutrality is private choice because government neutral-
ity can often be assured by awarding government aid on the basis of
the private decisions of the citizenry. That is, programs that assign
benefits to religious institutions based solely on the private prefer-
ences of the citizenry make it difficult for the government to favor a
particular religion. "If numerous private choices, rather than the sin-
gle choice of a government, determine the distribution of aid pursuant
to neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at least
cannot easily, grant special favors that might lead to a religious estab-
lishment."'165 Where private choice is operating, there is no danger
that the "imprimatur of state approval can be deemed to have been
conferred on any particular religion."' 66 This principle was demon-
strated in various prior opinions, such as Witters, Rosenberger, and
Zobrest.t67 In accordance with these decisions, the Mitchell Court
held that the government aid did not result in government
indoctrination.168
Moving on to the second Agostini criterion, whether recipients are
defined by religion, the Court again found neutrality and private
161. Id. at 808 (stating, "respondents do not challenge the District Court's holding that Chap-
ter 2 has a secular purpose .... ).
162. Id. (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
163. Id. at 829 (noting that Chapter 2 aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria);
see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
164. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809.
165. Id. at 810.
166. Id. at 813 (quoting Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397).
167. Id. at 810-11 (stating, "The principles of neutrality and private choice, and their relation-
ship to each other, were prominent ... in Zobrest, Witters, and Mueller"). See the discussion of
these cases, supra.
168. Id. at 812-13.
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choice to be relevant. 69 Because private choice leads to neutrality
and religious-neutrality by definition means that religion is not a de-
fining criteria, under a neutral system, government aid is never
awarded according to the religion of its recipients. Under this second
Agostini criterion, the Court looks closely at whether the government
aid program defines recipients by reference to religion so as to create
a direct incentive for religious indoctrination. 170 In Mitchell, both re-
ligious and nonreligious schools received the government aid, thus
creating no incentive for parents to send their children to schools that
teach religion. For example, no parent would choose to send his or
her child to a religious school simply because the religious school re-
ceived government-funded tape recorders, because government-
funded tape recorders are also available at public and nonreligious
private schools. Thus, government aid created no further incentive to
send a child to a religious school; an inclination to do so must have
existed independent of the government aid. Accordingly, the Court
held that the program at issue did not define its recipients according
to religion and did not result in additional incentive to religious
indoctrination. 171
In addressing the plaintiff's arguments, the plurality also made clear
that the distinction between direct and indirect aid to religious schools
had little constitutional relevance. 172 Similarly, building on what was
implicit in Bowen, Zobrest and Rosenberger, the plurality finally took
the extra step of explicitly renouncing the Court's prior practice of
assessing whether an institution is "pervasively sectarian. 1 73 The plu-
rality opined that this criteria was a thinly-veiled attempt by the Court
to violate the Establishment Clause by discriminating against Roman
Catholic institutions. 174 Finally, the plurality suggested that some mi-
169. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813.
170. Id. In Agostini, the Court observed that an incentive for religious indoctrination is not
present "where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor
disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondis-
criminatory basis." Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231.
171. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 814.
172. Id. at 815-16.
173. Recall that in Bowen v. Kendrick, Chief Justice Rehnquist made a weak statement that
the pervasively sectarian nature of some of the recipients made no difference because they were
just a minority of the recipients. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610-11. As Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Zobrest made clear, the Catholic High School would have qualified as pervasively sectarian by
virtue of its many religious attributes. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 18-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet
the Court made no mention of this factor being even slightly relevant to its analysis. Similarly, in
Rosenberger, the publication at issue, Wide Awake, presented only a Christian viewpoint, mak-
ing it completely sectarian. Yet again, this fact was not even mentioned by the Court. So it's not
surprising that the Mitchell plurality made explicit what had been implicit for some time.
174. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
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nor diversion of government-funded materials for religious education
is not grounds for invalidating a program on Establishment Clause
grounds.175 Unfortunately, however, the Court's opinion by Justice
Clarence Thomas was only a plurality opinion, making it difficult to
tell how far the Court is willing to extend the reasoning of the Mitchell
opinion.176
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Steven Breyer joined the judg-
ment, but not the reasoning of Mitchell. In a concurring opinion writ-
ten by Justice O'Connor, these two Justices agreed with the plurality
that "neutrality is an important reason for upholding government-aid
programs against Establishment Clause challenges.' ' 177  Justice
O'Connor, however, would not give as much deference to neutral pro-
grams as would the plurality. In her view, the Court has "never held
that a government-aid program passes constitutional muster solely be-
cause of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing
aid. 17 8 Further, she stated that the "direct/indirect aid" distinction
has some utility and that the diversion of government-funded materi-
als is still a ground for invalidation.1 79 She did, however, seem to
agree that private choice is particularly important to the constitution-
ality of government funding, suggesting that in the future she-and
thus a majority of the Court-will vote to uphold programs where aid
flows to religious institutions only as a result of private choice. 180 Be-
cause school vouchers are simply a vehicle for effectuating private
choice, it seems that Justice O'Connor, along with the plurality, will
uphold their constitutionality. Thus, the whole line of cases from
Bowen to Mitchell bodes well for voucher supporters.
175. Id. at 834 ("the evidence of actual diversion and the weakness of the safeguards against
actual diversion are not relevant to the constitutional inquiry. ... ).
176. The reasoning of a plurality opinion does not necessarily create the law for subsequent
cases. "When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, to the extent that Justice
O'Connor's concurrence is narrower than the majority's reasoning, it is the law that binds the
lower courts.
177. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 837.
180. Id. at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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IV. SIMMONS-HARRIS V. ZELMAN
A. Background
The school voucher program in Simmons-Harris that produced so
much litigation ironically resulted from litigation over the quality of
the Ohio schools. Previously, a federal district court had placed man-
agement of the schools under the supervision of the State Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction.18 t In response, the Ohio legislature in 1995
enacted the voucher program, which covers the districts placed under
the state's supervision.'8 2  Among these were the Cleveland
schools. 18 3 The program provides scholarships to children in these dis-
tricts from kindergarten through middle school, and gives a strong
preference to underprivileged students. Indeed, over sixty percent of
the families that received vouchers had incomes at or below the pov-
erty line.18 4
The vouchers provide money directly to parents in the form of
checks that are sent to the schools. 85 The parents must then endorse
the check before the school can obtain any of the funds.8 6 Once the
checks have been endorsed, there is no limitation on what the schools
may do with the funds. 18 7 The parents select the school they want
their child to attend. 188 They may select any private school in their
district or any public school adjoining the district, so long as these
schools are willing to accept the student. 18 9 Participating schools may
not discriminate on the basis of religion. The parents face no govern-
ment coercion to send their children to a religious or nonreligious
school, although for reasons unrelated to the government, most of the
participating schools are sectarian. 190 In the 1999-2000 school year,
181. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948, petition for cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 23 (2001).
182. OHIO REV. CODE § 3313.975(A) (1995).
183. Simmons-Harris v. Geoff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1999).
184. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948.
185. Id.
186. Id. ("Scholarship checks are mailed to the school selected by the parents, where the
parents are required to endorse the checks over to the school in order to pay tuition.").
187. Id. at 949.
188. Id. at 948.
189. The Simmons-Harris majority made much of the fact that at the time the suit was filed,
no public schools had accepted students from adjoining districts. Because of this, the vouchers
were being used only at private schools.
190. Specifically, as in Nyquist, most of the schools are operated under the auspices of the
Roman Catholic Church. This is because the Roman Catholic Church had a system of schools in
place long before the voucher program was instituted. This system of educational institutions
arose, in part, because Roman Catholics historically faced discrimination in public schools.
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3,761 students were enrolled in the voucher program, with 3,632 (or
ninety percent) attending sectarian schools. 191
The amount paid to each family depends on family income and the
cost of tuition. Ohio will pay up to ninety percent of whatever tuition
the private school charges low-income families, up to $2,500, and sev-
enty-five percent of tuition for other families, up to $1,875.192 The
number of scholarships awarded each year is limited by the amount of
money allocated by the Ohio legislature.' 93 None of the money is
earmarked for teaching either secular or religious subjects, although
the Sixth Circuit made much of the fact that the sectarian schools "be-
lieve in interweaving religious beliefs with secular subjects."' 94
The program was the subject of a previous lawsuit in the Ohio
courts. In fact, the case made its way to the Ohio Supreme Court,
which held that the law authorizing the voucher program violated the
one-subject rule of the Ohio constitution. 195 The court, therefore, in-
validated the scheme, but not before opining that it withstood scrutiny
under the Establishment Clause.' 96 The Ohio legislature subsequently
re-enacted the program, this time complying with the Ohio Constitu-
tion. It was this law that a federal district court held to violate the
Establishment Clause,' 97 a decision that the Sixth Circuit reviewed. 98
B. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis
Judge Clay delivered the opinion for the divided panel. The court
began its analysis by noting some of the changes that have occurred in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The court believed that the
Lemon test was the proper test to apply to the voucher program. 199
Although the court paid lip service to cases expressing the contempo-
rary Establishment Clause jurisprudence, such as Agostini v. Felton200
and Mueller v. Allen,2 0 1 it instead elected to follow outdated cases,
such as Nyquist,20 2 finding it to be "the most persuasive" and "on
191. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
192. OHio REV. CODE §§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313978(A) (1995).
193. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 205.
194. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949.
195. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 203.
196. Id.
197. Simmons-Harris, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834.
198. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 949-50.
199. Id. at 953.
200. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203.
201. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388.
202. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 958 (stating, "We find that Nyquist governs our result.").
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point with the matter at hand. ' 20 3 The court based its decision on two
main points: (1) Nyquist was so factually similar that it controlled; and
(2) the program was not neutrally available to all students.20 4
1. Vouchers and Nyquist
In considering the Ohio program, the court held that the present
scheme was exactly like the tuition reimbursement program at issue in
Nyquist.20 5 According to the court, under both systems, low-income
203. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 953. The court's fixation with Nyquist and its purported
concomitants brings to mind the words of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, which aptly describe the
actions of the Simmons-Harris majority as it followed the dictates of the judicial religion:
Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the prod of a remorseless logic,
which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite, they
perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that
they obey the bidding of their office. The victim is offered up to the gods of jurispru-
dence on the altar of regularity.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924).
204. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959 (stating, "Despite the language of the statue, there is no
evidence that the tuition vouchers serve as a neutral form of state assistance .... ).
205. Id. at 958. On the same day that the Court decided Levitt, it decided Comm. for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, which addressed a New York statute that provided both
direct aid to private schools and financial incentives to parents of private school students. 413
U.S. 756 (1973). Specifically, New York provided direct grants to qualifying private schools that
were to be used for repair of school buildings, tuition reimbursements to children attending
private schools, and a tax credit for parents of private school students. Id. at 762, 764. The
Court unanimously held the direct aid to be unconstitutional, but it split 6-3 on the tuition reim-
bursement and the tax relief, with Chief Justice Warren Burger dissenting along with Justices
Byron White and William Rehnquist.
In an opinion for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell set forth some important principles that
the Court has subsequently used in deciding school aid cases. First, it reiterated that, despite its
name, the Establishment Clause will be held to preclude even laws that do not establish a relig-
ion. It will be used by the Court to invalidate those laws that "benefit all religions alike." Id. at
771. Furthermore, the court applied the Lemon test, indicating again that the failure to meet any
of the three criteria would result in invalidation. Id. at 773. As to the primary effect prong,
direct aid to a religious institution will be considered as having a primary effect of advancing
religion. Id. at 774 (stating that "[it simply cannot be denied that this section has a primary
effect that advances religion in that it subsidizes directly the religious activities of sectarian ele-
mentary and secondary schools"). It is also worth noting that the portion of the program that
provided direct aid to religious schools was held unconstitutional by every member of the Court.
But the Court also softened some of its prior Establishment Clause language and practices.
For example, the Court indicated that it will not question a stated legislative purpose for a stat-
ute that seems plausible on its face. Thus, the Court accepted New York's asserted purpose for
the law: the interest in preserving a healthy and safe education environment for all students,
promoting diversity, and assisting an overburdened public school system by making sure that
private school students did not flood the public school classrooms en masse. Id. at 773. Of
course, the Court may have applied a light touch in assessing the asserted state interests because
it knew that it was going to invalidate the law on the "primary effect" prong of Lemon anyway.
But the Court also pruned back some of its earlier language as to the "primary effect" prong of
Lemon. Thus, although this criterion purports to invalidate any law that benefits any religion-a
broad pronouncement indeed-Nyquist recognizes the irrationality of such a rule and its contra-
diction to the holdings of Everson and Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (noting that
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parents received funds to help defray the costs of sending their chil-
dren to private schools. As in Nyquist, the majority of the money en-
ded up supporting sectarian schools. 20 6 The court correctly perceived
that it was irrelevant that the parents in Nyquist received a grant, a
reimbursement, or a tax credit20 7 because each are simply different
forms of the same government aid. Similarly, in both cases, no steps
were taken to ensure that government funds were used only for secu-
lar education; it was possible, though not proven, that the funds were
used by the schools to fund religious education. 20 8 Because of the
identity with Nyquist, the Sixth Circuit held that it controlled and that
the Cleveland program was unconstitutional for the same reasons. 20 9
2. No Neutrality
The Sixth Circuit also based its decision on its belief that the tuition
vouchers were not distributed in a religiously-neutral fashion. 210 The
property tax exemption for church property does not violate the Establishment Clause even
though this benefits religion by relieving those churches of the financial burden of paying prop-
erty taxes). Therefore, only state aid that provides substantial and direct benefits to a religion
will be invalidated. Id. at 771 (stating that "not every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or
'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.").
The Court previously made this point in other cases, including McGowan v. Maryland, where it
recognized that upholding Sunday closing laws would have the effect of promoting religious
observance of Sunday as a Christian holy day. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441 (1961).
The Nyquist court also held, somewhat contrary to Everson, that providing parents with reim-
bursement for tuition paid to religious schools also had the effect of impermissibly aiding relig-
ion. The Court so held even though the reimbursements were paid directly to the parents, and
not the religious institutions. The Court stated that this indirect payment was "only one among
many factors to be considered" in the "primary effect" analysis. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781. The
key point for the Court in Nyquist seemed to be that the reimbursement was paid only to chil-
dren in private schools, whereas Everson and Tilton involved aid to both public and private
school students. Id. at 782 n.38. Finally, contradicting what it previously said about indirect
benefits to religion not offending the Establishment Clause, the Court focused on the fact that
the money could have been used by parents to fund religious education. It contrasted this with
Everson, where the funds went solely for transportation expenses and thus could not be used to
subsidize a religious education. Id. at 783. The Court was being disingenuous here, as the par-
ents could have used the reimbursement in Everson or Nyquist for anything they chose. As in
Everson, the reimbursement program provided no direct funding to schools, so the parents'
choice was an intervening cause between the government and any indirect benefit to religion.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 811 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To withstand scrutiny under Nyquist, then, a
voucher program apparently will survive the Lemon "effect" analysis only where it (1) is availa-
ble to both public and private schools students and (2) is paid to the parents and not a religious
institution.
206. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 958.
207. Id.
208. Id. In cases like Zobrest and Agostini, the Court has moved away from its former prac-
tice of presuming that when the state and religious schools work together, both will ignore the
Constitution and will act so as to violate the Establishment Clause.
209. Id. at 961.
210. Id. at 959.
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court was forced to concede that the voucher program does not re-
strict entry to only religious schools, but facial neutrality was not
enough. 211 Because the program created a disparate impact-that is,
it resulted in greater participation by religious schools than by secular
ones-the court believed that it violated the Establishment Clause,
apparently under the primary effect prong of Lemon.212 As the court
put it,
The school voucher program is not neutral in that it discourages the
participation by schools not funded by religious institutions, and the
Cleveland program limits the schools to which a parent can apply
the voucher funds to those within the program. Practically speak-
ing, the tuition restrictions mandated by the statute limit the ability
of nonsectarian schools to participate in the program, as religious
schools often have lower overhead costs, supplemental income from
private donations, and consequently lower tuition needs.213
Notably, the court never identifies any way in which the state actively
"discourages participation by schools not funded by religious institu-
tions. ' '214 Any disparity was an unintended effect of circumstances
unrelated to religion yet it still elected to strike down the program.
V. SIMMONS-HARRIS, VOUCHERS, AND THE EVOLVING
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The United States Supreme Court's understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause has obviously meandered over the years, sometimes
turning toward greater church-state cooperation, and sometimes en-
dorsing an impregnable wall of separation. As Agostini v. Felton and
Mitchell v. Helms demonstrate, the Court's present course is much
more accommodating of a church-state relationship based on mutual
respect.215 Slowly, the Court seems to be coming back to its original
understanding that church and state can peacefully coexist, and that
the interests of the two do indeed frequently run along a parallel
course, as each is essential to maintaining an ordered and moral soci-
ety.216 Realizing this, the Court has been more tolerant of coopera-




215. See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
216. Government and religion are "the regulative agencies by which men are restrained and
the social interest in general security is protected." RoscoE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COM-
MON LAW 139 (Marshall Jones Co., 1921). Government is based on law, and law is based on
morality, frequently religious morality. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (stating
that "[t]he law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality .... ); School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (stating that
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tive church-state ventures, particularly when there is a pronounced
secular benefit to the venture. Thus, for example, in Bowen v. Ken-
drick, the Court upheld government funding of religious organizations
that counseled, consistent with the groups' Roman Catholic morality,
against premarital sex. If successful, the teenage pregnancy rate
would drop, a boon for society and the taxpayers. 217 Because both the
Roman Catholic organization and the government wanted to curtail
teenage pregnancies and the religious groups were simply an effective
means of serving this important government interest, the Court per-
ceived no Establishment Clause bar to government cooperation with
religion.218
Similarly, since the founding of the Nation, America's leaders have
recognized that education, including religious education, is vital to the
life of the State,219 as education is the key to both society's moral and
material success. 220 Most religions also seek a better-educated popu-
lace, with respect to both ethics and more "secular" pursuits. In the
"[n]either government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance of the fact that ...
many of our legal ... values derive historically from religious teachings."). Thus, more often
than not, mainstream religions and the government will pursue the same goals: a moral, law-
abiding citizenry that is also financially secure.
217. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 612-13 (stating that "[o]n an issue as sensitive and important as teen-
age sexuality, it is not surprising that the Government's secular concerns would either coincide
or conflict with those of religious institutions.").
218. Id.
219. The Framers "believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion are a public good."
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). William Bennett collected a number of excerpts from the speeches and writings of
America's Founders, all demonstrating that these wise men saw religious education as indispen-
sable to the creation of a prosperous nation.
From devout churchgoers to rationalizing deists, the Founders spoke with one voice
about the importance of including religion in civic life. Washington, a Virginia Episco-
palian, warned in his Farwell Address: "Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to
political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports ... and let us with
caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion."
John Adams, a Massachusetts Unitarian, agreed in no uncertain terms: "Our Constitu-
tion was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the
government of any other." Madison, another Episcopalian, insisted that "before any
man can be considered a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of
the Governor of the Universe." And even Jefferson agreed. Jefferson, the great deist
who was always skeptical of sectarianism in any form, asked, "Can the liberties of a
nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in
the minds of the people that these liberties are a gift of God? Religion, he concluded,
should be regarded as "a supplement to law in the government of men," and as "the
alpha and omega of the moral law."
WILLIAM J. BENNETTr, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY: IMPROVING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
AND AFFIRMING THE COMMON CULTURE 169 (1988).
220. Morality can be taught in various ways, and it need not always be done overtly. Thus,
even education in mathematics and the sciences can have moral dimensions. All "education is
moral education because learning conditions conduct ...." GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFT AS
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area of education, at least, government and religion have overlapping
interests: both see the multifaceted value of education and both de-
sire to promote excellence in education. In light of this common inter-
est, it is surprising that some courts, like the Sixth Circuit, dwell only
on the religious aspect of private school education. In doing so, they
fail to appreciate all that religious schools have to offer through edu-
cational opportunities, particularly in those communities where such
opportunities are scarce. More importantly, courts like the Sixth Cir-
cuit have failed to perceive the import of the new Supreme Court ju-
risprudence.2 21 In particular, they have not grasped the fact that
programs that operate on a religion-neutral basis will seldom, if ever,
violate the Establishment Clause.
A. Government Neutrality
The Court has long made neutrality the cornerstone of its Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence. 222 As Justice Clark stated in Schempp,
"In the relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly
committed to a position of neutrality. '223 Further in Roemer, the plu-
rality observed the following: "Neutrality is what is required. The
State must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor
impede religious activity. '2 24
It is true that the Court occasionally departed from its practice of
deferring to neutral programs, but even when it did so it paid lip ser-
vice to the neutrality principle. Thus, in Ball, Justice William Brennan
wrote that the Establishment Clause requires "the government to
maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and between religion
and nonreligion. '225 More recently, the Court has made clear that
neutrality is the keystone to any compliance with the Establishment
Clause. For example, the Court in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet stated, "[W]e have frequently relied
explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious
groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause chal-
SOULCRAFT: WHAT GOVERNMENT DOES 19 (1983). Accordingly, educational deficiencies can
manifest themselves in the form of morally-deficient conduct, such as violent crime.
221. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959.
222. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400 (stating, "The historic purposes of the Clause simply do not
encompass the sort of attenuated financial benefit, ultimately controlled by the private choices
of individual parents, that eventually flows to parochial schools from the neutrally available tax
benefits at issue in this case.").
223. Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963).
224. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion).
225. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382, overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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lenges. '226 The next year, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia where the University of Virginia claimed that
the Establishment Clause prevented it from funding a pervasively sec-
tarian journal, the Court offered the following: "A central lesson of
our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental
programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality
towards religion. '227 Agostini reiterated this principle, and so it was
no surprise that the Mitchell plurality made neutrality the key aspect
of its reasoning. It offered,
In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the
State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to
the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad
range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. If the
religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for govern-
mental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that a
particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of
government. 228
Neutrality is important because the Establishment Clause primarily
prohibits favoring one religion over another,2 29 which is what happens
when a government establishes a state religion or passes a law "re-
specting" an establishment of religion. But if all religions are treated
equally-that is, neutrally-there is no danger of an official establish-
ment of religion or the strife that such an establishment could en-
tail.230 The jealousies of seeing a competing religion being favored by
the government should not be inflamed where opportunities are ac-
cessible to all citizens and where public money is distributed without
regard to the recipients' religious beliefs. No one can claim favoritism
when a government program does not discriminate against adherents
of a particular religion or those who espouse no particular faith.
In light of the importance the Court has placed on neutrality23' and
the equality of access inherent in voucher programs, it is particularly
226. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994).
227. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
228. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (plurality opinion).
229. It is true that the Court has also said that the Establishment Clause prohibits the govern-
ment from favoring religion over non-religion.
230. "The First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by any realistic measure create
none of the dangers which it is designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially
involve the state in religious exercise or in the favoring of religion as to have meaningful and
practical impact." Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
231. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (stating, "We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is
respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded poli-




surprising that the Sixth Circuit arrived at the decision it did. The
program at issue was nothing if not neutral. First, the program was
neutral as to awarding the vouchers to the participating children. No
one was excluded from receiving a voucher on the basis of his or her
religious beliefs or lack of beliefs. True, lower income families were
favored, but there was no indication that there is a correlation be-
tween lower financial status and the espousal of religious beliefs. 232
Furthermore, the selection of which school the children would attend
was completely a function of private choice. As the plurality noted in
Mitchell, private choice is indicative of government neutrality. 233 Pri-
vate choice "helps guarantee neutrality by mitigating the preference
for pre-existing recipients that is arguably inherent in any governmen-
tal aid programs. '234
Second, the schools were also treated in an evenhanded fashion.
No school was denied participation in the voucher program because it
espoused a particular faith or no faith at all. It is true that some public
schools in neighboring districts elected not to participate, but no one
disputes that they were free to do so if they so chose. Like the par-
ents, the school districts also had a choice. The same vouchers that
were offered to private schools were offered to public schools in
neighboring districts. The equality of treatment was indisputable.
In light of these facts, the Sixth Circuit's opinion is in serious con-
flict with the basic principles of the Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence that was reiterated in Mitchell and existed in many cases even
before Mitchell 235 Realizing this, the Sixth Circuit attempted to get
around this problem by twisting the notion of "neutrality." The court
believed that the equality of opportunity was irrelevant where the
funds offered were beneath the dignity of public school attention and
where most of the entities willing to accept them were religious ones.
In short, the court found the program unconstitutional because either
the Ohio legislature did not set the bounty high enough for there to be
232. In fact, there is probably an inverse correlation, because many of the beliefs and practices
of mainstream religions promote healthy lifestyles and potentially wealth-generating attributes.
See William J. Strawbridge et al., Religious Attendance Increases Survival by Improving and
Maintaining Good Health Behaviors, Mental Health, and Social Relationships, 23 ANNALS OF
BEHAVIORAL MEo. 68 (Feb. 2001) (discussing study which concludes regular churgoers lead
healthier lives by, for example, refraining from excessive drinking and smoking); Michael Novak,
How Christianity Created Capitalism, WALL ST. J. Dec. 23, 1999, at A-19; see generally MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1920) (discussing the correla-
tion between Protestantism and financial success).
233. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810 (plurality opinion).
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. 203; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819.
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true equality of access or because the financial standards of religious
schools were too low as compared with the public schools.
B. Insufficient Funding
The Sixth Circuit's analysis on neutrality and the amount of finan-
cial aid offered in each voucher is seriously flawed. The court con-
ceded that the program was framed in neutral terms.236 Its problem
was with the way the program operated. Because of the public
school's refusal to accept vouchers, the program ended up providing
assistance only to parochial school students. The court contrasted this
to the Witters case, where all blind students, regardless of what school
they attended, could receive government funds.237 Although, by its
terms, the Cleveland program does not intentionally discriminate
against public school students (i.e., there is no disparate treatment), in
the short term, it had the effect of aiding only private school students.
Importantly, there is nothing in the opinion suggesting intentional dis-
crimination against students who want to use a voucher to attend a
public school or public school students who want to use a voucher to
attend a private school. Surely the School District did not hide the
appropriate forms whenever an administrator from a private, non re-
ligious school asked about joining the program. Similarly, there was
no evidence that the state threatened violence to any parent who
wanted to send his child to a nonreligious school.
The words of the Sixth Circuit demonstrate that it based its decision
on a disparate impact theory: "Practically speaking, the tuition re-
strictions mandated by the statute limit the ability of nonsectarian
schools to participate in the program, as religious schools often have
lower overhead costs, supplemental income from private donations,
and consequently lower tuition needs. '238 What the Sixth Circuit
finds objectionable, then, is not any overt discrimination against non-
religious schools, but the way in which the religious schools are run
that allows students of those schools to take full advantage of the tui-
tion vouchers. At the core, the Sixth Circuit has a problem with facets
of religious schools that are tangential to their central religious mis-
sion and not peculiar to religious schools. These nonreligious features
permit those schools to make due with the amount of tuition offered
by the state, while for other reasons various private and public schools
236. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 959 (stating, "Admittedly, the voucher program does not
restrict entry into the program to religious or sectarian schools .....
237. Id. at 960. The Witters case is discussed in section IV-C infra.
238. Id. at 959.
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cannot. In particular, the court identified the ability of religious
schools to maintain lower overhead and solicit donations.2 39
One of several problems with the court's reasoning is that these at-
tributes are not intimately connected to religion. Many schools-re-
ligious and otherwise-keep their overhead to a minimum. Although
because of limited resources religious schools may be forced to be
thriftier than others, there is nothing preventing public schools or non-
religious private schools from similarly tightening their belts. The
same reasoning applies to the solicitation of donations. Although do-
nations to public elementary and secondary schools have not tradi-
tionally been part of the public school landscape, there is nothing
preventing this from becoming commonplace. Certainly it is quite
common for public and nonreligious private universities to solicit do-
nations and bequests. Take for example, Harvard University-a pri-
vate, nonreligious school-which is the frequent beneficiary of private
donations. In short, there is no essential correlation between the re-
ligiosity of a school and its ability to make due with less money, partic-
ularly less government money.
The court might have been implying that the religious schools can
"afford" to pay their teachers less than public school teachers, Al-
though in many religious schools the teachers earn less than their pub-
lic school counterparts, low wages are not inherently and exclusively
part of religious schools. It is true that at one time many Catholic
schoolteachers were nuns who were willing to work for poverty wages,
but that is no longer the case (and even when the nuns did occupy
most teaching positions at Catholic schools, their paltry salaries were
not the sole cause of the Catholic school's efficiency.2 40 ) By far, the
majority of Catholic schoolteachers are dedicated lay people who
work for a regular wage, although they usually receive less monetary
compensation than public school teachers enjoy. Theoretically, there
is nothing to prevent public schools or nonreligious private schools
from reducing salaries in an effort to compete with religious
schools.241 To the extent that public school officials are reluctant to
239. Id.
240. At St. John Chrysostom elementary school in the Bronx, the "cost per pupil is far less
than in public schools even after account is taken of the free services of those teachers who are
nuns." MILTON AND ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 159 (1980).
Friedman plainly states the cause of this efficiency: "Control has been taken away from bureau-
crats and put back where it belongs." Id.
241. Some might argue that religious schools have an advantage not enjoyed by other schools
insofar as they can pay lower salaries to the extent that they are exempt from the National Labor
Relations Act, and thus need not fear adverse union activity. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding that the NLRA does not apply to religiously-affili-
ated schools). The import of Catholic Bishop of Chicago is that religious schools are under no
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do so, students should not be deprived of a voucher to attend a school
of their choice.
More importantly, the analysis of a voucher program according to
the Establishment Clause should not turn on the fact that religious
elementary schools have become experts at fundraising and thrifti-
ness. Indeed, it is preposterous to suggest, as the Sixth Circuit does,
that the constitutionality of a voucher program turns on the fact that
religious schools are willing to accept students for $2,250, but non-
religious schools are not.242  Presumably, there is some threshold
amount that would entice nonreligious schools to participate, say,
$7,000 per pupil. Apparently at that point, the program would then be
constitutional, as both religious and nonreligious schools would com-
pete for students. This distinction, and the reasoning upon which it is
based, makes no sense. Indeed, under this reasoning, religious schools
would also be receiving almost $5,000 more per pupil. Theoretically,
statutory duty to collectively bargain with labor representatives of teachers; also, religious
schools may fire teachers who seek to organize a union, because they are not constrained by
Sections 8(a)1 or 8(a)3 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3). Nevertheless, there is no
indication that a religious school has ever made use of this exemption by, say, terminating an
employee for attempting to organize a union. Furthermore, some Catholic school teachers have
formed unions and negotiated agreements with Catholic schools even in the absence of NLRA
protection. Also, public schools enjoy the same advantage that religious schools do in that they
too are not subject to the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (exempting public schools from coverage
by the NLRA political subdivisions of States); Strasburger v. Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 351, 359 (7th
Cir. 1998) (county school board is a political subdivision of a State and therefore not covered by
the Labor Management Relations Act); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp.
1396, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
On the other hand, some states have elected to make themselves subject to restrictions similar
to those of the NLRA. See Columbia Transit Corp. v. Jones, 572 F.2d 168,170-71 (8th Cir. 1978)
(discussing the Minnesota Public Employees Labor Relations Act of 1971, which is "roughly
parallel to the NLRA" and extends "to employees who are not covered by the Act."). Further-
more, most states have elected to subject government employers to "prevailing wage" laws, simi-
lar to the federal Davis-Bacon Act, which could constrain a local school board's ability to reduce
wages. But before anybody weeps for the local school boards, it should be remembered these
constraints are voluntarily imposed by the States themselves, and they are free to change their
own laws if necessary to make their schools competitive with private institutions.
242. The Sixth Circuit opinion also demonstrates little appreciation of market economics. Of
course, no public school is willing to accept a student for only $2,250. Additional students entail
additional troubles and paperwork, and the voucher program offers no incentive for monopolis-
tic public schools to expend extra effort to accept a voucher student from another school district.
Furthermore, while a nonreligious, private school (which unlike the public school would actually
have to compete with religious schools) might eventually accept students for $2,250, no smart
investor would invest in a voucher program facing the possibility of invalidation by courts like
the Sixth Circuit. Before sinking funds into such a venture, investors will first wait to see that
the voucher program has constitutional viability. As the Sixth Circuit's Simmons-Harris opinion
demonstrates, investors in private education were wise to wait. Ironically, the court based its
opinion in part on the lack of private, nonreligious schools competing for voucher students, a
phenomenon probably induced by investor fear that the Sixth Circuit would rule exactly as it
did.
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this gives the religious schools $5,000 more to spend on religious edu-
cation. It is hard to believe that the Establishment Clause requires
such a result.
Similarly, if tomorrow the public schools started accepting the
vouchers, then the program would apparently become constitutional.
This gives public school officials de facto power to decide whether the
program is constitutional, a strange result indeed. Apparently, under
the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, the program would also be constitution-
ally viable if the State of Ohio required public schools to accept the
vouchers. Even then, however, there might still be a problem from
the Sixth Circuit's perspective if no students elected to use their
vouchers at public schools. In short, the Court of Appeals relied on
an irrational basis in striking the program. The voucher program may
raise some legitimate Establishment Clause issues, but whether the
vouchers provide enough funding per pupil is not one of them. Simi-
larly, the constitutionality of the program should not turn on the deci-
sion of private schools to accept the amount-even if it were a
pittance that no school in its right mind would accept-offered by the
State. Not surprisingly, no Supreme Court case has ever held that
there is a minimum amount of funding a program must provide to
withstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.
The Supreme Court also will certainly reject the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion to consider the extended effects, rather than a primary effect, of
the voucher program. Agostini and Mitchell show that Lemon's "pri-
mary effect" analysis is still the key to deciding these types of govern-
ment-funding cases.243 The Sixth Circuit's analysis of this issue,
however, is seriously flawed because of its emphasis on the disparate
impact "suffered" by nonreligious schools that choose not to partici-
pate in the voucher program. This is not a primary effect of the
voucher program,244 rather it is a result of the decisions made by pub-
lic and nonreligious private schools. As the discussion above illus-
trates, public and most nonreligious private schools have elected not
to compete for voucher students for several different reasons. Among
these reasons are the following: (1) the public schools are not re-
quired by law to accept the voucher students and have no incentive to
take on extra burdens involved in competing for them; (2) investors
are unsure how courts will treat voucher programs and are reluctant
243. Similarly, one could fairly consider more than one effect to be "primary." This is not to
say that courts should not look at the secondary effects of a government program.
244. As Judge Ryan noted in dissent, "There is not a scintilla of evidence in this case that any
school, public or private, has been discouraged from participating in the school voucher program
.... "Simmons-Harris, 234 F.2d at 970 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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to risk their money by investing in them; or (3) nonreligious schools
have not yet perfected the art of penny-pinching and begging for do-
nations and so are not in a financial position to accept the amount
offered by the state. For these and other reasons unrelated to the
essence of the voucher program or the way it distributes funds, non-
religious schools are not competing for voucher students. Thus, this
lack of competition cannot honestly be called a "primary effect" of the
programs under any reasonable understanding of causation.
C. Nyquist is Not Controlling
Contrary to the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Simmons-Harris, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Nyquist is no barrier to voucher pro-
grams, particularly in light of subsequent decisions clarifying the Ny-
quist's holding and the Establishment Clause. 245 Recall that Nyquist
involved a New York program that provided tuition reimbursement
and a tax deduction to parents who sent their children to private
schools.2 46 The program did not cover parents who sent their children
to public schools because they did not pay tuition. Indeed, this was a
key aspect of the Nyquist holding. In distinguishing the New York
program from the aid provided to students in Allen 247 and Everson248
that the Court previously held to be constitutional, the Supreme Court
noted, "Allen and Everson differ from the present litigation in a sec-
ond important respect. In both cases the class of beneficiaries in-
cluded all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in private
schools. '249 This concern is not present in the Cleveland voucher pro-
gram because vouchers are available to students who choose to attend
public schools neighboring their own district, nonreligious private
schools, or religious private schools. 250 In short, there is complete
neutrality.
245. See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203. It's true that in Agostini the
Court said that courts should not assume or imply that it overruled earlier precedents. Agostini,
521 U.S. at 237. But Nyquist is many respects not truly precedential with respect to voucher
cases, as it did not entail the use of school vouchers. Furthermore, anyone can see that many of
Nyquist's premises and conclusions have been fatally undermined by decisions like Zobrest,
Agostini, and Mitchell.
246. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 764 (1973). Nyquist
also involved grants for the maintenance and repair of private schools. Id.
247. Allen, 392 U.S. at 236 (holding that loaning textbooks to private schools does not violate
the Establishment Clause).
248. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that state reimbursement of transpor-
tation expenses for private school students does not violate the Establishment Clause).
249. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
250. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948, 949.
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Moreover, to the extent that Nyquist would compel a different re-
sult, many aspects of Nyquist are no longer good law.251 For example,
the Court's decision was also based on the belief that some of the state
money would ultimately fund religious education and speech.252 The
Court has made clear in Witters, Zobrest, Rosenberger, Agostini, and
Mitchell that some public funding of religious speech does not violate
the Establishment Clause if the funding is the result of private choices.
For instance, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the government funds
were going to be spent on religious education because Larry Witters
was attending the Inland Empire School of the Bible to become a pas-
tor, missionary, or youth director.253 Nevertheless, this did not create
a problem under the Lemon test because the purpose was not to aid
religion and the primary effect was not the favoring of religion.254
As to the primary effect, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote for the
Court: "It is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not violated
every time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed
to a religious institution. '255 Although the Court believed that a di-
rect subsidy of a school violated the Establishment Clause, it held that
the program at issue was not such a program because any funds that
the school received were a result of Larry Witters' private choice, a
choice the law empowered him to make. 256 "Any aid provided under
Washington's program that ultimately flows to religious institutions
does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients. Washington's program is 'made available
generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-non-
public nature of the institution benefited."' 257
Similarly, in Zobrest, the state-supported translator would translate
religious material for James Zobrest.2 58 Thus, the government funds
251. In his dissent in Mueller v. Allen, Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices William
Brennan, Harry Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens, argued that the tax deduction at issue was an
impermissible subsidization of religion, and that Nyquist compelled a different result. Mueller,
463 U.S. at 411 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating "Nyquist made clear, however, that abso-
lutely no subsidization is permissible unless it is restricted to the purely secular functions of those
schools."). This suggests, at least according to these four Justices, that Mueller v. Allen implicitly
overruled Nyquist.
252. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 783 (stating, "There has been no endeavor to guarantee the separa-
tion between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure the State financial aid
supports only the former." ) (internal quotations omitted).
253. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 486.
256. Id. at 487.
257. Id. at 488 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83).
258. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 4, 12.
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would ultimately support religious education. Nevertheless, this
posed no problem under the Establishment Clause because the use of
government funds for this sectarian purpose was the result of a private
choice. Recall, in Rosenberger, the Court held that the use of govern-
ment funds to pay for publishing a religious magazine at the Univer-
sity of Virginia did not violate the Establishment Clause. 259 Again,
because the religious message was attributable to private, rather than
governmental, choices, the Establishment Clause was not implicated.
Nyquist is no longer good law because it fails to take into considera-
tion the cleansing effect that general availability and private choice
have on the use of government funds. Nyquist hardly, if at all, consid-
ered the effect that private choice has in insulating the government
from religion. It did not explicitly assess the cleansing effect that pri-
vate choice has on funds that make their way to sectarian schools. It
made only two statements somewhat related to this argument: "the
fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is one
among many factors to be considered" 260 and "[t]he absence of any
element of coercion [of parents], however, is irrelevant to the ques-
tions arising under the Establishment Clause. ' 261 Because the Nyquist
Court never had the benefit of this argument and never considered
the understanding gained from cases such as Witters, Zobrest, Rosen-
berger, Agostini, and Mitchell, it is not the most applicable case for
assessing the constitutionality of the Cleveland program and it is cer-
tainly not controlling.
Similar to the program in Witters, the Cleveland program relies on
individuals to decide where to spend the money.262 Some schools that
will receive the vouchers are sectarian, just as those in Witters and
Zobrest. And just as the schools attended by Witters and Zobrest,
some of the education is religious in nature. Still, that fact does not
make the program unconstitutional under the primary effect prong of
Lemon. The primary effect of the program is the secular education of
students; the fact that a small part of the private school curriculum
also involves religious education makes no difference because, as in
Witters, "no more than a minuscule amount of the aid awarded under
the program is likely to flow to religious education. ' 263
259. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 826, 845-46.
260. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781.
261. Id. at 786.
262. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948.
263. Witters, 474 U.S. at 486. At least for Larry Witters, most of the money was going to pay
for religious education. Because this was a result of a private decision by Mr. Witters, this fact
did not bother the Supreme Court and similarly should not have bothered the Sixth Circuit with
respect to the Cleveland program.
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D. The Distinction Between Direct/Indirect Funding
During the era when the Supreme Court was predisposed to strike
down any cooperative ventures of religion and government, one of the
features it seized upon was the concept of "direct funding." Thus, if
the government provided money directly to a religious school, the
Court would frequently hold that it impermissibly favored that relig-
ion.264 In contrast, if the state provided aid to a third party who con-
ferred the benefit on a religious institution, then the Court considered
this extra step as a buffer between church and state, which insulated
the process from an Establishment Clause challenge.2 65 But the Court
has not been consistent even in this inconsistency, as Nyquist held un-
constitutional a New York program that involved reimbursement and
tax abatements for parents of private school students. 266 From time to
time, various Justices realized that the direct/indirect distinction often
had little constitutional relevance. 267  Whether an individual gives
money obtained from the government directly to a church, or gives it
to a third person who then conveys it to a church, makes no difference
from the perspective of the financial benefit the church receives. The
same is true of government tax exemptions: whether the government
subsidizes the churches or simply declines to extract as much money
from them as it does from the rest of society, the bottom line is the
same. The church benefits financially under either scheme. Because
any financial advantage the church obtains also profits its members
(i.e., they do not have to pay as much to maintain the church as they
264. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780 (stating that "it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever
form is invalid").
265. See, e.g., Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87 ("[A] State may issue a paycheck to one of its em-
ployees who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without
constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends to
dispose of his salary."); Everson, 330 U.S. at 1 (upholding the reimbursement of parents for the
transportation of their children to private schools). As the Arizona Supreme Court has
observed:
[U]nder both federal and state law, organizations unabashedly devoted to promoting
religion-churches and other religious institutions-enjoy a number of direct economic
tax benefits. These organizations escape income taxes, see A.R.S. § 43-1201(4), (11),
and are not required to file returns, see A.R.S. § 43-1242. Taxpayers who donate to
them can deduct the contributions from their federal and state income taxes. See 26
U.S.C. § 170; A.R.S. § 43-1042(A). Additionally, many of these organizations are ex-
empt from property taxes, see Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 2(2), a direct government benefit
which has long been held nonviolative of the Establishment Clause.
Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 613 n.2 (Ariz. 1999). But see Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 765 (hold-
ing unconstitutional New York's program of tuition reimbursement and tax relief for parents of
children attending private schools).
266. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 764-65, 780-81.
267. "A tax exemption in many cases is economically and functionally indistinguishable from
a direct monetary subsidy." Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 859 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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would if the government did not provide tax exemptions), tax abate-
ments have the same effect as the government providing the church
members with money, which they in turn convey to the church.2 68
Justices in favor of an expansive Establishment Clause have seized
upon the fact that governmental aid to parents of religious school stu-
dents ultimately results in governmental aid to religious schools, re-
gardless of how many steps it takes to get there.2 69 Thus, in Nyquist,
where New York provided tuition reimbursements to the parents of
private school students, the Court elected to disregard the fact that
parents received the tuition reimbursement (just as the parents in Ev-
erson received a transportation reimbursement) and held that this was
still government aid provided to a religious institution.270 Similarly, in
Ball, the Court observed,
The programs challenged here, which provide teachers in addition
to the instructional equipment and materials, have a similar-and
forbidden-effect of advancing religion. This kind of direct aid to
the educational function of the religious school is indistinguishable
from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious school
that is most clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause. 271
Justices who read the Establishment Clause in line with the Fram-
ers' intent reason differently. 272 They believe that if so-called "indi-
268. Tax exemptions are actually more beneficial to the churches than government payments
to third parties would be: (1) tax exemptions preclude a church from ever having to pay a
penalty for non-payment of taxes, which might result if church members were late in making
donations; (2) in light of the time value of money, tax exemptions result in greater value to
churches than payments to church members, since the church has the financial benefit the mo-
ment the taxes are due, while the church member might not make his donation until much later;
(3) because they need not rely on donations for the financial benefit of tax exemptions, church
leaders don't have the worry of whether sufficient funds will be forthcoming, and thus have the
benefit of the certainty that tax exemptions provide and the ability to make plans accordingly;
and foremost (4) tax exemptions mean that the church will enjoy this financial benefit regardless
of individual church members who, were they given the money by the government, might elect
to spend it in other ways.
269. See, e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at 395, overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997).
270. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 781 (stating that "the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than
to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered").
271. Ball, 473 U.S. at 395, overruled in part by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
272. The Framers thought it important to teach moral principles along with secular subjects.
Hon. James L. Buckley, The Constitution and the Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 24 HARV. J.
OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 200 (2000) (quoting THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
470 (1871) (stating, "As Thomas Cooley noted in his authoritative treatise, Constitutional Limi-
tations, the Framers considered it appropriate for government 'to foster religious worship and
religious institutions, as conservators of the public morals and valuable, if not indispensable as-
sistants to the preservation of the public order.'"). The Framers' understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause, like the rest of the First Amendment, should elicit a pause in judges before
deciding cases that seek to prohibit longstanding practices in the name of the Constitution. As
Justice Scalia has mentioned:
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rect" aid is constitutional, then a less circuitous route (i.e., direct aid)
is also permissible. In effect, they look beyond the form of the trans-
action to examine whether the substance results in impermissible fos-
tering of religion. If the substance is permissible, whether the money
comes through a direct route or takes a couple of detours along the
way makes no difference with respect to the Constitution. Similarly, if
the federal government enacts a law to fund only Methodist Church
services, it makes no difference how many times the money changes
hands before it arrives in church coffers. It still violates the Establish-
ment Clause. As the Mitchell plurality noted, "Although some of our
earlier cases, particularly Ball, did emphasize the distinction between
direct and indirect aid, the purpose of this distinction was merely to
prevent the 'subsidization' of religion. '273
What the Court should have said originally, and what it eventually
did say, is that government funding of a religious institution does not
violate the Establishment Clause when the money flows to those insti-
tutions as a result of a third party's private choice to attend a religious
school or to seek treatment at a religiously-affiliated hospital.27 4
Thus, for example, in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the
Blind, there was no Establishment Clause violation where the govern-
ment paid the tuition of a student studying to be a pastor because the
government made the funds available to all blind students regardless
Thus, when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears
the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that
dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it
down. Such a venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid on the examining table
and scrutinized for its conformity to some abstract principle of First Amendment adju-
dication devised by this Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff
of which the Court's principles is to be formed. They are, in these uncertain areas, the
very point of reference by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices are to
be figured out.
Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95-96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is some-
times called "mute behavior." Thus, "if for many generations it never dawns on anyone to use
humiliation in the stocks as punishment, the absence of that form of punishment is a mute be-
havior," it might be that such punishment is universally recognized as unusual punishment. Sim-
ilarly, if "until about 1970 no one imagined that the Constitution protected a right to abortion,
that also is a mute behavior," which suggests that no such constitutional right exists. ROBERT F.
NAGEL, JUDICIAL POWER AND AMERICAN CHARACrER: CENSORING OURSELVES IN AN ANX-
IOUS AGE 152 (1994). It is related to, though different from, the practice of assessing the consti-
tutionalty of specific church-state interactions by analyzing whether the individual Framers
viewed them as permissible. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Con-
stitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that has gone of Itself, 37 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 674,
675-76 (1987) (noting that some Justices "gauge the constitutionality of church-state activities
like nativity scenes, legislative chaplains, and public school prayer by appeals to 'tradition' (that
is, whether the "Framers" countenanced a similar endeavor) .....
273. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
274. Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
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of their religion, and the student, rather than the government, chose
the religious school.275 It makes no difference if the government gives
the money directly to the school or if it gives the money to the stu-
dent, knowing that the money will end up in the coffers of the relig-
ious school. Either method is proper under the Establishment Clause
because, under both systems, the government is acting neutrally: it
neither favors nor disfavors religion or students seeking a religious
education.
In light of the utter meaninglessness of the direct/indirect funding
distinction, it is not surprising that the Mitchell plurality specifically
renounced the relevance of this distinction to the Establishment
Clause analysis.276 Nevertheless, it appears that Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Steven Breyer, along with the dissenters, have not
come around to this understanding. 277 Until at least one of them does,
it appears that a majority of the Court will still hold that direct aid to
religious schools is a cause for alarm and may signal a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
Fortunately for the Cleveland program, it does not result in direct
aid to religious schools. It entails the government issuing a check to
the students' parents who endorse the check to the school. Notably,
the funds can go to private schools or even public schools in neighbor-
ing districts, so long as those schools choose to accept the student.278
The required parental endorsement of the check demonstrates that
the neutrality principle is completely operative here. As in Agostini,
the "aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose to
275. Id. at 489 (holding that government payments to seminary student to reimburse him for
tuition payments to sectarian college did not violate the Establishment Clause).
276. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 829.
277. Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating, "This characteristic of both
programs makes them less like a direct subsidy, which would be impermissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause, and more akin to the government issuing of a paycheck to an employee who, in
turn, donates a portion of that check to a religious institution."); Id. at 888 n.8 (Souter, J. dissent-
ing) (stating, "The plurality misreads our precedent in suggesting that we have abandoned di-
rectness of distribution as a relevant consideration.").
278. The Sixth Circuit got hung up on the fact that most parents participating in the voucher
program elected to send their children to religious schools. That should not be surprising to
anyone, as most private schools are affiliated with some religion. It does not mean, however,
that permitting parents a choice in the education of their children is a subterfuge to fund only
religious schools. Religious schools presently constitute a majority of private schools, but if the
business community sees that government funds will consistently be available for private educa-
tion, and that this will be a reliable source of capital, entrepreneurs will soon make investments
in non-religious private schools. So long as Courts like the Sixth Circuit invalidate voucher pro-
grams, however, investors will be skittish about placing their valuable capital in a program that
might be invalidated by the judiciary, thereby making the Sixth Circuit's observation that most
private schools are religious schools a truism.
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attend. '2 79 The government funds are disbursed to the religious
schools only after going through the parents and only as a result of
private parental choice.2 80 While it should make no difference
whether the government issues the check to the schools or the par-
ents, the extra step of requiring parental endorsement clearly demon-
strates that the government is not favoring a particular religion; it is
favoring education and respecting its citizen's right to choose a quality
education for their children. In light of Cleveland's decision to adopt
the approved form of indirect aid to private schools, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision is even more baffling.
E. Pervasively Sectarian
Closely related to the "direct aid" consideration is the question of
whether a religious school is "pervasively sectarian." As the Mitchell
plurality pointed out, the Supreme Court has sometimes expressed
concern about the disbursement of government funds to institutions
that are pervasively sectarian. 28' As the Court also mentioned, "per-
vasively sectarian" was often a code phrase meaning "Catholic," and
indeed, the Court has never defined the term with any precision, prob-
ably because everyone knew, with a wink and a nod, that the term
meant "Roman Catholic. '282
Take for an example Roemer v. Board of Public Works.28 3 Because
direct aid was involved, the plurality held that the funding would be
279. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
280. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d at 948.
281. See, e.g, Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609-10; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743; Ball, 473 U.S. at 385.
282. America has a long history of government discrimination against religious schools, partic-
ularly Roman Catholic schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon
prohibited parents from sending their children to Catholic grammar and high schools). From
time to time, hatred for particular religions has also infected the Supreme Court. Former Demo-
cratic Senator and Ku Klux Klansman Hugo L. Black despised Catholics. HOWARD BALL,
Hucio L. BLACK: COLI) STEEL WARRIOR 16 (1996) (stating, "Black sympathized with [the
Klan's] economic, nativist, and anti-Catholic beliefs ...."). Indeed, Black and/or his law part-
ners successfully represented a man who murdered a Catholic priest in cold blood after the priest
has married his daughter to a Hispanic man. In doing so, he "urged the jury to show the world,
by their verdict, that Birmingham's Protestants would not allow their daughters to be prosely-
tized by Catholics." Id., at 59-60, 262 n.83 (claiming that Black's law partner actually defended
Fr. Coyle's murder); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: Huoo BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER
& CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA 81-82 (1989) (claiming that Black himself defended
the murder). Another Democratic appointee, Justice James C. McReynolds, was an anti-Semite.
BALL, supra at 89 (stating, "A virulent anti-Semite, McReynolds did not speak to Justice Louis
D. Brandeis for three years after Brandeis, the first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, was ap-
pointed in 1916.").
283. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736 (plurality opinion). Roemer is a plurality opinion, written by
Justice Blackmun, upholding Maryland's practice of giving financial grants to religious colleges
and universities. Although they agreed that the primary purpose and effect of the program
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constitutional only if it did not go to institutions that were "perva-
posed no constitutional problems, Justices White and Rehnquist declined to fully join the plural-
ity opinion because they believed the separate "excessive entanglement" analysis was unwar-
ranted. See id. at 769 (White, J., concurring). As in most Establishment Clause cases from this
period, there were four dissenters: Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and Stevens. Roemer is
also similar to most other Establishment Clause cases in that it involved a challenge to the fund-
ing of Roman Catholic institutions.
As the dissenters noted, Roemer is one of the few cases involving direct financial aid to relig-
ious schools. Although the state-provided funds could not be used directly for advancing relig-
ion, they were otherwise unrestricted. Id. at 740-41. By being used for other expenses of the
school, these government funds permit the school to use their own money to advance their relig-
ious purposes. Regardless, five Justices agreed that this does not violate the Establishment
Clause, suggesting that the same might be true for school vouchers.
The plurality purported to apply the Lemon test to the facts of the case. As usual, the Court
had no problem finding a secular purpose: the support of private higher education. Id. at 754.
As to the primary effect of the state aid, because direct financial assistance was being provided
to sectarian colleges and universities, the Court held that the funding would be constitutional
only if it did not go to institutions that were "pervasively sectarian." Id. at 755 (citing Hunt, 413
U.S. at 743). The Court defined a "pervasively sectarian" school as one where "secular activities
cannot be separated from sectarian ones." Id. at 755. The district court held that the institutions
were not pervasively sectarian, and the Court held that this finding was supported by the record.
Specifically, the Court found the following issues to be relevant: (1) none of the institutions
reported to the Catholic Church; (2) attendance at religious exercises was not required; (3) al-
though religion courses were mandatory, non-religious subjects were also taught "without relig-
ious pressures;" (4) although some classes were begun with a prayer, there was no official policy
requiring this; (5) except for the theology departments, most hiring decisions were not made on
the basis of religion; and (6) although most of the students were Catholic, the schools did not
discriminate against non-Catholics in their admission decisions. Id. at 755-57.
The finding that the schools were not pervasively sectarian was not the end of the matter,
however. The Court also held that to satisfy the "primary effect" prong of Lemon, the record
must show that the state money was used only to directly fund secular activities, although a
permissible secondary effect might be the funding of religious activities. Id. at 760. In contrast
to the Court's previous practice of imputing a devious proclivity to ignore Establishment Clause
limitations on funding, it assumed "that the colleges, and the Council, will exercise their dele-
gated control over uses of the funds in compliance with the statutory, and therefore the constitu-
tional, mandate. It is to be expected that they will give a wide berth to 'specifically religious
activity,' and thus minimize the constitutional questions." Id. Based on this assumption, the
Court held that the government aid did not have the primary effect of advancing religion.
As to the "excessive entanglement" question, the plurality admitted that there "is no exact
science in gauging the entanglement of church and state." Id. at 766. It did, however, find four
factors relevant: (1) the character of the schools (not-pervasively sectarian colleges, as opposed
to elementary and secondary schools); (2) the form of the aid (no prescribed uses and thus little
government oversight); (3) the process of annual funding (as opposed to more intrusive meth-
ods); and (4) the lack of political divisiveness engendered by the program. Id. at 762-65. Be-
cause the secular and sectarian activities of the colleges were easily separable, the plurality
agreed that there was no proven danger of excessive entanglement. Id. at 764. Notably, Justices
White and Rehnquist refused to join this aspect of the plurality opinion, because they believed
there was no need to consider any entanglement question, at least not as a factor separate from
the purpose and effect analysis. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768 (White, J., concurring) ("It is unclear to
me how the first and third parts of the Lemon I test are substantially different.") (footnote
omitted). "As long as there is a secular legislative purpose, and as long as the primary effect of
the legislation is neither to advance nor inhibit religion, I see no reason particularly in light of
the sparse language of the Establishment Clause to take the constitutional inquiry further." Id.
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sively sectarian. 2 84 The plurality considered a "pervasively sectarian"
school as one where "secular activities cannot be separated from sec-
tarian ones .... "285 In agreeing with the district court that the institu-
tions at issue were not pervasively sectarian, the plurality considered
several relevant issues: (1) none of the institutions reported to the
Catholic Church;28 6 (2) attendance at religious exercises was not re-
quired; (3) although religion courses were mandatory, nonreligious
subjects were also taught "without religious pressures;" (4) although
some classes began with a prayer, there was no official policy requir-
ing this; (5) except for the theology departments, most hiring decisions
were not made on the basis of religion; and (6) although most of the
students were Catholic, the schools did not discriminate against non-
Catholics in their admission decisions.287 Hoping to ensure that no
Catholic institutions received any government money-despite the
fact that Catholics were also taxpayers and, therefore, entitled to the
same benefits of other citizens-the Court has sometimes suggested
that even indirect aid would violate the Establishment Clause if pro-
vided to pervasively sectarian institutions.2 88
Although the pervasively sectarian nature of the schools at issue in
Simmons-Harris did not-on the surface, at least-play a large part in
the Sixth Circuit's decision, the pervasively sectarian nature of many
private schools could present a problem for voucher programs like
that in Cleveland. Undoubtedly, most schools involved in that pro-
gram would be considered pervasively sectarian under the indicia
mentioned in Roemer. For many of the schools, the secular and relig-
ious teachings are not easily separated in that the instructors always
attempt to instill moral values in the children, whether the venue is a
science class or physical education.2 89 Not surprisingly, most also re-
284. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (citing Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743).
285. Id.
286. It is not clear what the Court meant by this. These institutions might not fill out a written
report every year to the Vatican, but all Catholic institutions of higher education come under the
jurisdiction of the local Bishop, and thus in some sense "report" to him. See, e.g., Lemon, 403
U.S. at 617 (stating, "The Rhode Island Roman Catholic elementary schools are under the gen-
eral supervision of the Bishop of Providence and his appointed representative ... .
287. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-57.
288. "This 'indirect subsidy' effect only evokes Establishment Clause concerns when the pub-
lic funds flow 'to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its
functions are subsumed in the religious mission ....' Ball, 473 U.S. at 394 n.12 (1985), over-
ruled in party by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
289. Perhaps the public schools should attempt to emulate private schools in this respect, at
least so far as the Establishment Clause permits. As Roscoe Pound noted: "For there is a strong
social interest in the moral and social life of the individual." RoSCoE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 132 (1921). But, "teaching character is a difficult task." WILLIAM J. BENNETr,
OUR CHILDREN AND OUR SCHOOLS: IMPROVING AMERICA'S SCHOOLS AND AFFIRMING THE
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quire prayer and attendance at religious programs 290 and make some
hiring decisions on the basis of religion. Furthermore, at least with
the Catholic schools, the instructors answer to the pastor who, in turn,
answers to his bishop.
Depriving these schools of their religious character would also rob
them of their distinct identity. Considering that the academic success
of religious schools might be due in large part to their religious nature,
this would also deprive these schools of their secular value. Thus, be-
coming "pervasively secular" is not an option for them and, indeed,
should not be required.291 Yet if the Court elects to readopt its policy
of discriminating against sectarian schools, children who otherwise
would benefit from the discipline and structure of private schools will
continue to suffer educational deprivation. 292
COMMON CULTURE 19 (1988). At present, parents get no help in teaching ethics from public
schools, which are presently forced by the Establishment Clause jurisprudence to ignore the
ethical dimensions of their students.
290. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blachmun's dissent
describes the religious nature of the Catholic high school James Zobrest was attending.
James Zobrest requested the State to supply him with a sign-language interpreter at
Salpointe High School, a private Roman Catholic school operated by the Carmelite
Order of the Catholic Church. Salpointe is a "pervasively religious" institution where
the two functions of secular education and advancement of religious values or beliefs
are inextricably intertwined. Salpointe's overriding "objective" is to instill a sense of
Christian values. Its distinguishing purpose is the inculcation in its students of the faith
and morals of the Roman Catholic Church. Religion is a required subject at Salpointe,
and Catholic students are "strongly encouraged" to attend daily Mass each morning.
Salpaointe's teachers must sign a Faculty Employment Agreement which requires them
to promote the relationship among the religious, the academic, and the extracurricular.
They are encouraged to do so by assisting students in experiencing how the presence of
God is manifest in nature, human history, in the struggles for economic and political
justice, and other secular areas of the curriculum.
Id.(citations and internal quotations omitted).
291. Unfortunately, there is always the danger that schools will abandon some of their religi-
osity to conform to a liberal society that does not think much of religion, except as a tool for its
political agendas. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM
AND AMERICAN DECLINE 282 (1996) (stating, "Clergy and church bureaucrats are members of
the intellectual class and look to that class for approval, an approval they cannot win through
their merits as religionists, but only through their political attitudes and political usefulness.").
292. It is true that the government does not affirmatively prohibit any child from attending
religious schools. But taking their parents tax dollars (thereby inhibiting or depriving them of
the ability to purchase education on their own) and refusing to provide any of the money to
religious schools, achieves the same result as an overt prohibition, at least for non affluent fami-
lies. Chief Justice Marshall was certainly correct when he noted that "the power to tax is the
power to destroy." By taxing families to provide educational "services," without giving the par-
ents an option to decide which services are in their children's best interests, government has
destroyed the freedom of choice that parents would otherwise have enjoyed.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's understanding of the Religion
Clauses has recently brought about a much-needed Renaissance in
First Amendment jurisprudence. Now, at least a plurality of the pre-
sent Court recognizes that "a constitution states or ought to state not
rules for the passing hour, but principles for an expanding future." 293
In both the present and the future, religious institutions can help gov-
ernment achieve many of its noble goals, particularly the education of
its citizenry, so long as primitive prejudices against religion are not
allowed to interfere with the Court's interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause. Under the Court's new understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause, there is nothing to prevent government from employing
religious schools to educate America's youth. This is especially so
when accomplished through the use of vouchers, because vouchers
empower parents to decide for themselves which school best provides
for their child's mental and moral development. Should they decide
that a religious school best comports with their child's education and
their tax dollars could best be spent in that venue, the Establishment
Clause does not stand in their way.
As demonstrated above, not every Justice on the Court has been
enamored with the evolving Establishment Clause jurisprudence, par-
ticularly as it was enunciated in the Mitchell plurality opinion. Most
notably, Justice O'Connor takes a more narrow view of what that
Clause permits. But even under Justice O'Connor's understanding of
the Establishment Clause, voucher programs like the one in Simmons-
Harris can meet constitutional standards, as long as the programs do
not intentionally discriminate against students who wish to attend
nonreligious schools or those who want to attend a school of a particu-
lar faith. This is such an elementary proposition that no program has
ignored it.
Because it is not clear just how much emphasis will be placed on the
distinction between the direct/indirect funding of religious schools, to
be safe, school funding programs should put as much distance be-
tween the government and the schools as possible. The safest alterna-
tive might be a system whereby school funds are transferred to a
private accrediting agency (perhaps one that evaluates schools solely
on the basis of test scores or other objective, secular criteria) that, in
turn, issues education vouchers or funds to parents who, in turn, pay
tuition to the schools. Of course, this system is undesirable insofar as
it creates a new bureaucracy (which will require the expenditure of
293. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921).
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more funds) and has a greater potential for fraud. Nevertheless, these
additional steps between the government and sectarian schools seem
to ease the minds of jurists focused on formalities.
In light of the present makeup of the Supreme Court, some pro-
grams whereby the government pays for education at sectarian
schools certainly will be capable of passing muster under the Estab-
lishment Clause. Unfortunately, it may take a little tinkering to ascer-
tain just how far Justice O'Connor will go in freeing governments
from the Court's outdated and oppressive Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. Once the reconstituted boundaries of the emerging Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence are better understood, compliance
should not be particularly onerous, even for pervasively sectarian
schools. Despite the present elements of uncertainty, the Cleveland
voucher program easily should pass constitutional muster.
For conservatives who value the religious identity and mission of
their churches, the most important question with respect to school aid,
however, does not concern the Establishment Clause at all. Those
who still hope for smaller federal and state governments may have
much to fear from government funding of religious schools. As the
Supreme Court has noted, "[M]odern governmental programs have
self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities. 2 94 "[W]e know
from long experience with both Federal and State Governments that
aid programs of any kind tend to become entrenched, to escalate in
cost, and to generate their own aggressive constituencies. And the
larger the class of recipients, the greater the pressure for accelerated
increases. '295 With the advent of government funding of religious
schools, there is a danger that churches might become the next power-
ful special interest group to come begging for government handouts.
And once on the government gravy train, it is hard to get off. It is
true that the present public school monopoly is hardly efficient, so
introducing a little free market competition into the equation will nec-
essarily yield benefits for taxpayers and pupils, 296 but there is a legiti-
mate concern that religious and secular institutions will form an
unholy alliance to extract even more money from unsuspecting tax-
294. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 624.
295. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797.
296. "[P]rivate schools frequently serve to stimulate public schools by relieving tax burdens
and producing healthy competition." Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 611 (Ariz. 1999). It's
no surprise to anyone that, because parents in wealthy communities have the ability to choose
where to send their children to school (ie., they have the capital to send them to a private school
if they are unsatisfied with the public school), excellent "public schools tend to be concentrated
in the wealthier suburbs of the larger cities, where parental control remains very real." MILTION
AND ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 158 (1980).
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payers. Furthermore, there is a danger that the private schools will
dilute their religious message or sacrifice their religious identities to
compete for a broader range of students.
Despite these prudential concerns, it is beyond reasonable debate
that voucher programs, such as the one employed in Cleveland, do not
violate the Establishment Clause because they offer their aid neutrally
among religions. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit's Simmons-Harris de-
cision is in for a rough ride before the Supreme Court. States must be
permitted to experiment with vouchers in an attempt to make
America a better-educated nation. The Supreme Court should not al-
low an anachronistic understanding of the Establishment Clause to
stand in the way. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court said that the state
has "a high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens .... ,,297 In
Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court has the opportunity to demon-
strate whether it truly believes what it said in Yoder, or whether big-
oted notions of "separation" will continue to foil attempts at
excellence in education.
297. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
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